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INTRODUCTION
The validity of preclusive defensive tactics is the most important unresolved
issue in the mergers and acquisitions field. In a typical scenario, a bidder
makes an all-cash, all-shares tender offer 1 at a substantial premium to the
market price of target company stock2 and conditions its offer on obtaining
enough stock to force a second-step merger with the target company.' If the
target company's board finds the offer price inadequate and resolves to fight
the offer,' it adopts or implements defensive tactics that preclude the offer as a
1. An all-cash, all-shares tender offer is an offer to buy 100% of target company shares for
cash.
2. Takeover premiums averaged 50% over the market in the 1980s. See Bernard S. Black,
Bidder Overpayment in Takeovers, 41 STAN. L. REV. 597, 601 (1989); Reinier Kraakman, Tak-
ing Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share Prices as an Acquisition Mo-
tive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 892 (1988); Lynn A. Stout, Are Takeover Premiums Really Premi-
ums? Market Price, Fair Value, and Corporate Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1235, 1235 & n.l (1990).
3. State law typically requires a 51% shareholder vote, see, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 1201(a)
(West Supp. 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (1991), or a 67% vote, see, e.g., N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 903(a)(2) (McKinney 1986), to effect a merger. Corporations are empowered to
adopt charter provisions increasing the vote necessary to effect a merger. See, e.g., DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(4) (1991). Most offerors desire to effect a second-step merger after acquir-
ing control of a target company. Conditioning the offer on the ability to effect a second-step
merger gives the offeror access to the target company assets as collateral and helps the offeror
obtain financing. Offerors also prefer to eliminate minority shareholders so that every corporate
decision made by the offeror is not open to legal challenge on the ground of unfair self-dealing.
See Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 499, 508 (7th Cir.) (Eas-
terbrook, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
4. This Article is limited to the legitimacy of the takeover defense in response to inadequate
offers. Other grounds recognized by the courts as the basis for tender offer defense include: "na-
ture and timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than share-
holders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk
of nonconsummation, and the quality of securities offered in the exchange." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
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practical matter.5 The bidder's ability to proceed with the offer often hinges on
litigation challenging the preclusive defensive tactics.
Proponents of the efficient markets hypothesis ("EMH") assert that preclu-
sive defensive tactics should be prohibited.6 According to EMH, the stock
market is the best indicator of any stock's value.7 If EMH is accurate, the
target company's board and shareholders do not have to judge the financial
adequacy of a premium offer because the market has already made that judg-
ment. The bidder is able to offer a premium because target company assets are
more valuable in its hands.8 According to this line of argument, preclusive
defensive tactics are impermissible because every premium offer is socially
beneficial.9
The Delaware courts have rejected the EMH view.'0 As a result, under cur-
rent law, some target constituency must pass on the economic merits of a
tender offer. Some Delaware cases have suggested that target company share-
holders must make this economic choice and that preclusive defensive tactics
are inappropriate." Other Delaware cases have suggested that the target com-
pany's board should play the primary role in assessing the merits of tender
offers.12 This Article argues that target directors should have access to preclu-
5. Any mechanism that will defeat the particular offer will suffice. A popular defensive tactic is
the poison pill rights plan. In its most common form, the target company's board issues one right
for every outstanding share of common stock. Until an acquiring person crosses a certain owner-
ship threshold, typically about 20%, the rights trade with the common stock. Once the acquiring
person crosses the designated threshold, rights certificates are issued enabling target stockholders
to buy one common share of the target company per right for a price that is higher than the
current value of the stock. If the acquiring person effects a second-step merger between it and the
target, target stockholders obtain the right to purchase shares of the acquiring company at half-
price. This type of poison pill is known as a flip-over rights plan. See, e.g., Moran v. Household
Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1348-49 (Del. 1985). Some poison pills, called flip-in plans, allow
target stockholders, other than the bidder, to purchase target company shares at half-price once
the bidder crosses the ownership threshold. See, e.g., Grand Metro. Pub. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558
A.2d 1049, 1051 n.2 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 791-92
(Del. Ch.), appeal dismissed, 556 A.2d 1070 (Del. 1988). The flip-over and flip-in provisions of
the poison pill constitute a substantial financial disincentive to hostile offers. However, before an
acquiring person crosses the designated ownership threshold, the poison pill may be redeemed by
the target company's board at a nominal price. The redemption provision allows negotiated offers
to proceed. See Moran. 500 A.2d at 1349.
6. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a Target's Man-
agement in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161, 1165-82 (1981); Alan
Schwartz, The Fairness of Tender Offer Prices in Utilitarian Theory, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 165,
165, 195 (1988); cf Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500-02 (Easterbrook, J.) (arguing that defensive mech-
anisms injure target shareholders).
7. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
8. See discussion infra part II.A.2.
9. See discussion infra part I1.A.2.
10. See infra text accompanying notes 28, 81.
1I. See discussion infra part I.B. (discussing the Delaware Court of Chancery's interpretation
of Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
12. See discussion infra part I.C. (discussing the Delaware Supreme Court's interpretation of
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985)).
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sive defensive tactics and that their actions should be subject to rigorous judi-
cial review.
Part I of this Article surveys the legal background in the takeover defense: a
difficult question. Part II argues that, for reasons consistent with and contrary
to EMH, the existence of a premium does not eliminate the need to judge the
merits of an offer. Preclusive defensive tactics may be appropriate in individ-
ual cases to force the bidder to raise its price, to conduct an auction, or to
safeguard the independence of the target company. Part III demonstrates that
target company shareholders are not the appropriate body to make the tender
offer decision because the tender offer process virtually forces them to accept
every premium tender offer. The courts and commentators have assumed that
an all-cash, all-shares offer that promises a second-step merger at the tender
offer price is noncoercive. Part III will demonstrate that this view is erroneous.
Part IV concludes that, even if shareholders could exercise free choice when
responding to tender offers, the target company's board should still play the
primary decision-making role because state corporation law makes the board
responsible for evaluating offers to sell the company and because the board is
better situated than shareholders to make tender offer decisions. Part V sug-
gests that the corporate election machinery and judicial review are adequate
safeguards against the danger that directors will further their own interests at
the expense of shareholders when adopting defensive tactics.
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. The Unocal Standard
In the first wave of takeover litigation, the courts held that board action in
opposition to a takeover bid was protected by the business judgment rule. 3
Pursuant to this standard, a party challenging directorial action must demon-
13. See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293-94 (7th Cir.), cert. denied. 454
U.S. 1092 (1981); Buffalo Forge Co. v. Ogden Corp., 555 F. Supp. 892, 904 (W.D.N.Y.), afd,
717 F.2d 757 (2d Cir,), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1018 (1983); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D. Md. 1982); Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 951
(N.D. III. 1982). But see Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233-34 (9th Cir. 1975). Some
courts applied a seemingly different test and refused to uphold defensive tactics unless the target
company's board could prove that the board's primary purpose in adopting such tactics was to
further shareholder interests rather than the board's. See Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d
357, 382 n.47 (2d Cir. 1980); Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 1964); Bennett v. Propp,
187 A.2d 405, 408 (Del. 1962). However, directors were able to articulate valid, nonselfish busi-
ness purposes for their actions, and the courts generally accepted such articulations without much
probing of whether these legitimate purposes were primary. See, e.g., Cheff, 199 A.2d at 555-56
(approving defensive maneuvers upon a finding that the board acted reasonably without determin-
ing the board's primary motivation). As a result, the primary purpose test proved indistinguishable
from the business judgment rule. See Terrydale Liquidating Trust v. Barness, 611 F. Supp. 1006,
1023 n.26 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); Ronald J. Gilson, A Structural Approach to Corporations: The Case
Against Defensive Tactics in Tender Offers, 33 STAN. L. REV. 819, 829 (1981); Note, Protecting
Shareholders Against Partial and Two-Tiered Takeovers: The "Poison Pill" Preferred, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1964, 1969-70 (1984).
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strate fraud, bad faith, or gross overreaching.1 4 The board will prevail when-
ever it can articulate a rational, unselfish business purpose for its action.1 5
Thus, the business judgment rule is a formidable standard for any plaintiff to
overcome.
1 6
The chief alternative to the business judgment rule is the intrinsic fairness
test. This standard applies whenever directors have a direct financial stake in
action taken by the board.1 7 Where the intrinsic fairness test applies, the di-
rectors must prove the substantive fairness of the transaction by an objective
standard.18 The courts rejected the intrinsic fairness test in the takeover de-
fense context for several reasons. First, directors do not have a direct financial
stake in the success or failure of a tender offer.' 9 Second, it is the responsibil-
ity of the target company's board, rather than the courts, to make substantive
business decisions.2 0 Finally, the courts have noted that application of the in-
trinsic fairness test would invalidate most defensive tactics.'
Nevertheless, target company directors face a conflict of interest when
adopting defensive tactics that have the effect, if not the goal, of perpetuating
the directors' authority.2 The business judgment rule, like the intrinsic fair-
ness test, is usually outcome determinative. 23 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
14. See, e.g., Panter, 646 F.2d at 293; Warshaw v. Calhoun, 221 A.2d 487, 492-93 (Del. 1966).
15. See Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 292 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 999
(1981); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971).
16. See, e.g., EARNEST L. FOLK, THE DELAWARE GENERAL CORPORATION LAW 75-81 (1972).
17. See ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW 138, 166-71 (1986). A typical example is a con-
tract between directors and the corporation. See, e.g., Cohen v. Ayers, 596 F.2d 733, 739-40 (7th
Cir. 1979).
18. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144(a)(3) (1991); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 713(b) (McKin-
ney 1986); Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Un-
derstanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction, 41 DEPAuL L. REv. 655 (1992); Andrew
G.T. Moore, The "Interested" Director or Officer Transaction, 4 DEL. J. CORP L. 674, 676
(1979). Intrinsic fairness is often difficult for directors to prove. See, e.g., Lewis v. S.L. & E., Inc.,
629 F.2d 764 (2d Cir. 1980) (invalidating contract between interlocking corporations); Wein-
berger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701 (Del. 1983) (invalidating freezeout merger transaction); Sin-
clair Oil, 280 A.2d at 722-23 (invalidating refusal by controlling shareholder to comply with
contractual obligations); Globe Woolen Co. v. Utica Gas & Elec. Co., 121 N.E. 378 (N.Y. 1918)
(invalidating contract between interlocking corporations).
19. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 n.l (Del. Ch. 1988).
20. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co, 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (noting that
takeover defense "decisions should be no less entitled to the respect they otherwise would be ac-
corded in the realm of business judgment").
21. See, e.g., AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 111 (Del. Ch.
1986); see Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defen-
sive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 247-48 (1989).
22. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 (noting that, in the takeover defense context, there is an
"omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own interests, rather than those
of the corporation and its shareholders"); Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1175.
23. See Anderson, Clayton, 519 A.2d at 11; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at
247-48 (asserting that use of the business judgement rule would effectively insulate target com-
pany defensive measures from judicial scrutiny).
1992]
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leum Co., 4 the Delaware Supreme Court recognized that the traditional stan-
dard for judicial review of takeover defense was too lenient, and created an
intermediate standard of review. 5 To have defensive tactics upheld under
Unocal, the target company's board must prove that it has "reasonable
grounds for believing that a danger to corporate policy and effectiveness ex-
ist[s]" and that such tactics are "reasonable in relation to the threat posed."26
The result in Unocal does little to elucidate the requirements of this new
test. In Unocal, an entity controlled by T. Boone Pickens owned 13 % of Uno-
cal and offered $54 per share in cash for an additional 37%. If the tender
offer succeeded, Pickens announced he intended to acquire the remaining 50%
of Unocal for securities that he valued at $54 per share. Unocal's investment
banker opined that Unocal was worth at least $60 per share on a liquidation
basis. The Unocal board rejected Pickens' offer as inadequate and commenced
a self-tender offer. In the event Pickens consummated his 37% tender offer,
the board resolved to purchase Unocal's remaining shares in exchange for $72
per share in Unocal debt securities. Shares owned by Pickens were not eligible
for the self-tender.
27
In addressing the first prong of its new test, the Delaware Supreme Court
rejected the EMH view28 and held that an inadequate offer price is a threat
warranting defensive action. 9 However, the court never examined whether the
Unocal board had sustained its burden of proving that it had reasonable
grounds to believe that Pickens' $54 offer, which represented a substantial pre-
24. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
25. Id. at 954-55; see also Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 249-51 (noting that aca-
demic and political pressures likely contributed to the formulation in Unocal of the intermediate
standard of review for defensive measures used by target companies in response to tender offers).
The direction taken by Unocal was suggested by Judge Cudahy's prescient dissent in Panter v.
Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 299 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1092 (1981).
26. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. If the board makes this showing, a plaintiff must then show that
the board violated the business judgment rule to prevail. Id. at 958; Moran v. Household Int'l,
Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). Although the Delaware Supreme Court has purported to
add this third prong to the Unocal test, it is of little practical relevance. If the target company's
board proves that it reasonably perceived a threat and that it acted reasonably in response to that
threat, there is little likelihood that a plaintiff will be able to show that the board's conduct vio-
lated the business judgment rule.
27. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 949-51.
28. See id. at 955 n.10. Similarly, in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), the
Delaware Supreme Court held directors liable in damages for accepting a merger proposal that
represented a 45% premium over market. The court held that the existence of such a premium
did not absolve the directors of their duty to investigate the intrinsic value of the company. Id. at
875-78. Although Van Gorkom is nominally a duty of care case, its clear implications are that
market price is not necessarily the best indicator of a company's worth and that, if the directors
find that a company is worth more than both the market and offer prices, the directors have a
duty not to facilitate the offer. In Unocal, the court extended Van Gorkom from the merger to the
tender offer context. Neither Van Gorkom nor Unocal contains any systematic analysis of the
validity of EMH.
29. Unocal. 493 A.2d at 955.
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mium to the previously prevailing market price, was inadequate.3" The court
did not scrutinize the Unocal board's bases for believing that the company was
worth more than $54 per share. Although the court noted that the target's
investment banker opined that Unocal was worth at least $60 per share on a
liquidation basis,31 the court did not evaluate whether this opinion was justi-
fied or whether liquidation was a potential option.
The court also did not apply the second prong of the new test in a rigorous
fashion. Whether the Unocal board's defensive action was reasonable in re-
sponse to the threat posed by Pickens' offer constituted a substantial question.
The self-tender was a show-stopper-a death blow to Pickens' offer. Assuming
Unocal was not worth $72 per share,"3 the self-tender represented an overpay-
ment to all of Unocal's shareholders except Pickens. 3 In effect, it represented
a substantial redistribution of income from Pickens to the rest of Unocal's
shareholders. The latter would be allowed to raid the Unocal treasury at Pick-
ens' expense. 4 Pickens, of course, was unwilling to proceed under this
scenario.
5
The court did not explain why this show-stopping defense was a reasonable
response to an inadequate offer. Perhaps it was designed to force Pickens to
negotiate with the Unocal board to generate an adequate price. Perhaps the
Unocal board had a business plan that would have generated value superior to
Pickens' offer. However, the court did not rely on any proof of this type.
The court also viewed the Pickens offer as a threat because it was two-tiered
(i.e., the court believed the $54 worth of securities offered in the second step of
the takeover attempt were worth less than the tender offer consideration of
$54 in cash). Although a two-tiered offer represents a substantial threat to
30. Unocal's stock traded at approximately $35 per share prior to Pickens' accumulation of
such stock. Pickens' $54 offer, therefore, represented a 53% premium. See Fred R. Bleakley,
Unocal's Partnership Plan, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 23, 1985, at D4.
31. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 950.
32. The Unocal board does not seem to have offered any proof that the company was worth $72
per share.
33. If the company was worth $72 per share, the self-tender price would merely have repre-
sented a fair exchange for the remaining minority interest. In that event, Pickens would have
purchased the initial 50% of Unocal at a substantial bargain and would have had no objection to
proceeding with the transaction.
34. Pickens had to be excluded from the self-tender because if all of Unocal's shareholders were
permitted to raid the corporate treasury by selling their shares back to the corporation for an
excessive price, there would have been no restraining influence on Pickens. Without the exclusion,
the self-tender would have been equivalent to a dividend declared equally to all shareholders, who
would have owned the same proportionate share in a smaller company as a consequence. Thus, if
Unocal was worth $60 per share (in which case Pickens' offer would have been inadequate but the
price of the self-tender would not have been justified), Pickens would have been willing to buy half
the company at the bargain price of $54 per share and then sell back whatever percentage of his
shares the self-tender allowed at the same premium as the other shareholders.
35. Pickens withdrew his offer on the next business day after the Delaware Supreme Court
upheld the Unocal board's exclusionary self-tender. Fred R. Bleakley, Pickens To End Bid for
Unocal, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1985, at DI.
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shareholder choice,86 the court did not cite or examine any proof showing that
the securities to be offered by Pickens in the second step were worth less than
$54 per Unocal share. Moreover, it is hard to justify the proportionality of the
show-stopping self-tender as a response to the two-tiered threat. If the board
had given the minority remaining after the first tier the right to receive $54
per share in cash, the two-tiered threat would have been completely removed.
Instead, the board offered $72 per share to minority shareholders, thereby es-
sentially precluding the Pickens offer.37 Thus, the opinion suggests that any
two-tiered offer can be precluded without regard to price.
The Unocal court's acceptance at face value of the justifications offered by
the target company's board is reminiscent of the traditional business judgment
rule.38 However, the new Unocal test purports to shift the burden of proof to
the target company's board and contains objective-proof language similar to
that of the intrinsic fairness test." Whether the Unocal test would allow target
company directors carte blanche in responding to takeover bids, tie their
hands, or accomplish something in between would be determined in future
cases.
B. The Delaware Chancery Court's Interpretation of Unocal
The Delaware Court of Chancery has, until very recently, used Unocal as a
vehicle for promoting shareholder choice and limiting the scope of the board's
power to oppose takeover bids. In City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc.,4° the
bidder ultimately offered $74 per share in cash for 100% of Interco's stock
and promised a second-step merger at the tender offer price. The Interco
board, upon the advice of its investment banker, found the offer inadequate,
refused to redeem the company's flip-in poison pill rights plan,4 ' and adopted a
36. See discussion infra part III.A.I.
37. The court also cited greenmail as a threat posed by the Pickens offer. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985). Greenmail can be defined as a repurchase of
securities at a premium from a substantial shareholder for the purpose of preventing that share-
holder from mounting a takeover attempt. E.g., Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 537 & n.3 (Del.
1986); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956 n.13; Note, Greenmail: Targeted Stock Repurchases and the
Management-Entrenchment Hypothesis, 98 HARV. L. REv. 1045, 1045 n.3 (1985). Although
Pickens had a justified reputation as a greenmailer, id. at 1046 n.8 (noting that Pickens' Mesa
Partners entity had recently made a greenmail profit of $89 million from Phillips Petroleum), it is
hard to understand why this threat justified the board's self-tender. Greenmail cannot be unilater-
ally imposed on a target company. The Unocal board simply could have refused to pay greenmail.
If the board was concerned that greenmail might be necessary to prevent Pickens from visiting
harms on the corporation or its shareholders, the board should have identified these threats and
relied on them to justify its defense rather than on the threat of greenmail.
38. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 252.
39. See supra text accompanying notes 13-26. See generally Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
21, at 252-60 (analyzing whether the Unocal intermediate standard of review is primarily a rhe-
torical instruction with minimal substance or a sincere inquiry into the legality of defensive ac-
tions implemented by target companies).
40. 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988).
41. See supra note 5 (describing the flip-in poison pill rights plan).
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restructuring. The restructuring involved the payment of a $66 per share cash
dividend. The company's investment bankers valued the company's post-re-
structuring shares at $10 per share, giving the restructuring a total estimated
value of $76 per share."2
The chancery court was willing to accept that: Interco's board "acted pru-
dently to inform itself of the value of the Company"; "[t]he board believes in
good faith that the [bidder's] offer is for a price that is 'inadequate,'" and
"[t]he board of Interco believes in good faith that the restructuring has a
value of 'at least' $76 per share."4 Nevertheless, applying Unocal, the court
enjoined the Interco board's refusal to redeem its poison pill.""
Applying the first prong of the Unocal test, the Interco court agreed that an
inadequate offer qualified as a "threat."48 The court, however, had a strict
view of what action was reasonable in response to the threat of inadequacy.
The Interco court believed that, because the bidder made an all-cash, all-
shares offer and promised a second-step merger at the tender offer price, its
offer was not coercive. 46 The court thought that Interco's shareholders were
entitled to exercise the free choice that the offer provided. In the court's view,
the only reasonable use of the poison pill in response to an inadequate offer
was to generate a higher third-party offer, either through negotiation or an
auction, or to create an alternative transaction for shareholders to consider.
Preclusive defensive tactics were an unreasonable response."7 Once the board
had generated the best alternatives, it was required to redeem the poison pill
and allow third-party offers to proceed. 48
42. Interco, 551 A.2d at 791-94.
43. Id. at 795.
44. Id. at 800. Curiously, the court declined to enjoin the restructuring, despite the fact that it
also was adopted without shareholder approval and would have precluded the offer. Id. at 800-03.
45. Id. at 797-98.
46. Id. at 790. As will be demonstrated, the chancery court's view is erroneous. See discussion
infra part III.B.2.
47. Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
48. Interco was foreshadowed by the chancery court's prior decisions. In AC Acquisitions Corp.
v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986), a bidder made an all-cash, all-shares
tender offer and promised a second-step merger at the tender offer price. The target company's
board responded with a self-tender for 65 % of its stock that promised equivalent value. The court
held that the self-tender was an unreasonable Unocal response because it precluded the bidder's
offer. Shareholders were entitled to choose between the competing transactions. Id. at 112-16.
Anderson, Clayton arguably is limited by the fact that the bidder's offer was concededly adequate.
The target company's investment banker was unwilling to provide an opinion to the contrary. Id.
at 108-10.
In Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (Macmillan 1), 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988), a
bidder offered $64 per share in cash for 100% of Macmillan, Inc., and promised a second-step
merger at the tender offer price. In response, the Macmillan board adopted a restructuring that
one of its investment bankers opined was worth $63-$68 per share. The bidder then raised its offer
to $73 per share. The court reaffirmed Anderson, Clayton and held that the restructuring response
was disproportionate to any threat posed by the offer because, inter alia, it did not allow share-
holders to choose between the alternative transactions. See id. at 1242. Macmillan I represented
an extension of Anderson, Clayton because Macmillan's investment bankers did opine, and the
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Interco was strongly endorsed in Grand Metropolitan Public Ltd. v. Pills-
bury Co."9 In that case, the bidder sought to acquire the entire equity interest
in Pillsbury for $63 per share. The Pillsbury board found the offer inadequate,
refused to redeem the company's flip-in poison pill plan,50 and announced that
it would spin off its Burger King subsidiary and sell certain other assets. The
chancery court required redemption of the poison pill and enjoined the Burger
King spin-off.5 1 The court held that, where the only Unocal "threat" posed by
the offer was its alleged inadequacy, using the poison pill to preclude share-
holder choice was a "Draconian" response that would not be countenanced.52
C. The Delaware Supreme Court's Interpretation of Unocal
In contrast to the chancery court, the Delaware Supreme Court has devel-
oped a body of Unocal precedent suggesting that target company directors
enjoy wide latitude in responding to hostile takeover bids and that the board
may preclude inadequate offers without giving shareholders any choice. The
chancery court was able to develop a seemingly inconsistent line of authority
because tender offer events overtook the parties before the chancery court
cases could be appealed, and none of the supreme court precedents constitutes
a square holding.
1. Moran v. Household International, Inc.
In Moran v. Household International, Inc.,5 3 the Delaware Supreme Court
considered the validity of a flip-over poison pill rights plan. 54 After holding
target company's board did find, that the bidder's offer was inadequate. Id. at 1237-38. The chan-
cery court was, however, notably unimpressed by the bankers' opinions. See id. at 1240-41. More-
over, the Macmillan I court would have allowed preclusive defense tactics if the board's alterna-
tive transaction had been at a demonstrably higher value than the tender offer price. Id. at 1242.
Interco does not make this concession.
49. 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988).
50. See supra note 5 (describing the flip-in poison pill rights plan).
51. Pillsbury, 558 A.2d at 1050-52, 1057, 1061.
52. Id. at 1058-60. In dictum, the chancery court in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition
Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989), sought
to limit the reach of Macmillan I, Interco, Pillsbury, and Anderson, Clayton. The court noted
that in each of these cases, the target company board had created a sale-type alternative to a
hostile offer in addition to refusing to redeem its poison pill. The court viewed these cases as
holding only that shareholders must be allowed to choose between tender offers and sale-type
alternatives. It took the position that pure preclusion, in the absence of an alternative transaction,
was an open question. Id. at 92,181. However, the opinions in the other cases did not purport to be
limited in this way. There has been speculation that the chancery court reversed its course because
the Delaware Supreme Court was dissatisfied with Interco, which the supreme court never had the
opportunity to consider on appeal. See Perry Kalajian, The Poison Pill and the Controversial
World of Corporate Mergers and Aquisitions: A Critical Assessment, 29 Hous. L. REV. (forth-
coming 1992) (manuscript on file with The Houston Law Review); William Meyers, Showdown in
Delaware: The Battle To Shape Takeover Law, INSTITUTIONAL INVESTOR, Feb. 1989, at 64, 75.
53. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
54. See supra note 5 (describing the flip-over poison pill rights plan).
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that the poison pill was authorized by Delaware's corporation statute,55 the
court examined its validity under Unocal. Applying the first prong of Unocal,
the court held that two-tiered and bust-up" offers were threats that a board
could take steps to oppose. Since the poison pill helps to prevent such offers, it
passed muster under the second prong of Unocal.57
The court also rejected the argument that the poison pill was a dispropor-
tionate response under Unocal because it deprived the shareholders of their
right of choice with respect to tender offers.58 The court noted that the poison
pill was not necessarily lethal to all offers.59 The court's conclusion regarding
this point is hard to fathom. The poison pill is lethal to most offers.6 0 In any
event, if shareholder choice is desirable, mechanisms that substantially impede
it should be as objectionable as those that prevent it entirely. In actuality, the
court believed that shareholder choice was not required by Delaware law. The
court noted that many defensive mechanisms that precluded shareholder
choice had been upheld and saw no reason to distinguish with respect to the
poison pill."
The Moran court seemingly gave no independent effect to Unocal's second
prong and suggested that once a cognizable threat appears any defensive ac-
tion is justified. 2 The poison pill does more than equalize the prices of the
tiers in a two-tiered tender offer; it precludes the offer completely. The poison
pill also has the potential to preclude single-tier offers that do not threaten a
bust-up of the target company.63 However, the scope of Moran is arguably
limited by the fact that the case dealt with the decision of a board to adopt a
poison pill plan, rather than a decision to implement a previously existing plan
to preclude a particular offer. The Moran court noted that, in deciding
whether to redeem the poison pill in response to an offer, the board's conduct
would be judged under Unocal. 4 Thus, the court may simply have postponed
application of the Unocal test.
2. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.
Shortly after Unocal and Moran, the Delaware Supreme Court seemingly
gave its imprimatur to preclusive defensive tactics in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAn-
drews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.6 5 Anticipating a hostile bid by Pantry Pride,
55. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1351-53.
56. A bust-up offer is one in which the bidder intends to sell assets of the target company to
help pay off the acquisition debt. Martin Lipton, Corporate Governance in the Age of Finance
Corporatism, 136 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 11 & n.40 (1987).
57. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356-57.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 1356.
60. See supra note 5 (describing the mechanics and effect of the poison pill rights plan).
61. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
62. See id. at 1354-57.
63. See supra note 5 (describing the mechanics and effect of the poison pill rights plan).
64. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1354.
65. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
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Inc., the Revlon board adopted a back-end rights plan that gave all of Revlon
shareholders except Pantry Pride the right to exchange their shares for notes
with a face value of $65 if Pantry Pride acquired more than 20% of Revlon's
shares but did not acquire all Revlon's shares for at least $65 per share in
cash. Pantry Pride informally offered $45 per common share in cash for 100%
of Revlon. It later commenced a $47.50 tender offer and conditioned its offer
on redemption or nullification of the rights plan. Pantry Pride raised its offer-
ing price to $50 and then $53 per share. The Revlon board enlisted Forstmann
Little & Co. ("Forstmann") as a white knight and generated a bidding con-
test. Pantry Pride, which ultimately raised its offer price to $58 per share,
successfully challenged certain preferential treatment given to Forstmann."
Once the Revlon board decided to create an auction, the continued indepen-
dence of Revlon ceased to be an issue, and it became clear that the board
would be required to redeem the back-end rights plan for the highest bidder.
Nevertheless, the Delaware Supreme Court went out of its way to address the
validity of using the rights plan to preclude Pantry Pride's offer prior to the
inception of the auction. Applying Unocal, the court noted that the rights plan
was a reasonable response to Pantry Pride's original offer, which the board
reasonably viewed as "grossly inadequate" and which portended a bust-up of
Revlon.17 The court never examined whether Revlon was worth $65 per share
(the back-end price) and seemed unconcerned that the rights plan would have
precluded any offer below $65 per share.
Revlon suggests that the target company's board would have been justified
in using the rights plan to preclude Pantry Pride's offer without regard to its
shareholders' wishes as long as the board had reasonable grounds to believe
that the Pantry Pride offer was inadequate. 6 However, because the rights plan
issue was rendered moot, the court's statements regarding preclusive defensive
tactics are dicta. As a consequence, this aspect of Revlon has largely been
ignored by later cases.
69
66. Id. at 182-85.
67. Id. at 180-81.
68. See Michael W. Schwartz, Chancery Court Ignores Del. Supreme Court Precedents, N.Y.
L.J.. June 5, 1989, at 45.
69. The Delaware Supreme Court strengthened the powers of target company directors in two
subsequent cases. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del. 1987), an
entity controlled by T. Boone Pickens offered $105 per share in cash for 42% of Newmont and
proposed to acquire any remaining shares in a second-step transaction for the same consideration
as the tender offer. Because, inter alia, the Newmont board viewed the offer as inadequate, it
engaged in a complicated restructuring designed to thwart the Pickens offer by enabling Consoli-
dated Gold Fields to purchase 49.7% of Newmont and control 40% of the Newmont board. As
part of this scheme, Gold Fields agreed to restrictions on the transferability of its shares and
agreed to support the board's nominees for the 60% of the board it did not control. The supreme
court upheld the Newmont board's actions under Unocal, in part as a response to the coercive
nature of Pickens' partial offer. However, the court also noted that the board was entitled to
pursue the continued independence of Newmont as a goal and responded appropriately in the face
of what the board considered to be an inadequate offer. Id. at 1342-45. The court approved the
board's conduct despite the fact that the board effectively precluded both Pickens' offer and any
[Vol. 41:689
LEGITIMACY OF TAKEOVER DEFENSE
3. Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.
The preceding chancery and supreme court cases set the stage for Para-
mount Communications v. Time Inc.7 ° Time had been seeking a merger part-
ner for some years to expand into the film industry. Time settled on Warner
Brothers as the best merger candidate. After long negotiations, Time and
Warner agreed to a merger, pursuant to which Time was willing to pay
Warner's shareholders a 12% premium to allow Time to be the surviving com-
pany. Time believed that preserving its corporate culture was crucial to its
integrity and continued success. After the merger agreement was announced,
Time's stock, which had been trading in the $103-$113 range, traded as high
as $122 per share.
71
Paramount then offered $175 per share in cash for 100% of Time's stock.
Time's board, on the advice of its investment banker, found the $175 offer to
be inadequate. The Time board believed that the Paramount offer, although
offering more value in the short-term than the merger with Warner, was not
adequate to capture the intrinsic value of Time plus a fair control premium.
The company's investment banker opined that one Time share would be worth
$150 after the merger and would trade between $208 and $402 within four
years of the merger.7 ' Time's board also recast the form of the acquisition.
Instead of a merger, which would have required the consent of Time's share-
holders, Time proposed to acquire Warner pursuant to a cash tender offer.
Time raised the premium it was willing to pay Warner's shareholders to 56%.
Paramount then raised its tender offer price to $200 per share, which the Time
board also rejected as inadequate.7 1
The chancery court viewed the original merger agreement, which was con-
cluded before Paramount surfaced as a bidder, as valid under the traditional
business judgment rule. However, recasting the transaction as a tender offer to
deprive Time shareholders of a vote the Time board feared it might lose was a
defensive tactic that triggered Unocal review. 7' The chancery court phrased
the essential questions as (1) whether the Time board was entitled to take the
other hostile offers. Schwartz, supra note 68, at 47.
In Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. (Macmillan I1), 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989), which
was primarily concerned with the board's duties when conducting an auction, the Delaware Su-
preme Court noted that target company directors must do more than merely refrain from breach-
ing the duties of care and loyalty. They also have a duty "to affirmatively protect and defend those
interests entrusted to them." Id. at 1280. This language suggests that the board may not stand
silently by and allow an inadequate offer to proceed. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131,
1146 (Del. 1990) (noting "the injunction of Unocal that the duties of care and loyalty prevent a
board from being a passive instrumentality in the face of a perceived threat to corporate control");
Schwartz, supra note 68, at 47 n.17.
70. [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), afid,
571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
71. Id. at 93,266-71.
72. Id. at 93,271-73.
73. Id. at 93,273-75.
74. Id. at 93,282.
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position that th.e merger agreement, although promising less value in the short-
term, was a more valuable long-term alternative, and (2) whether the Time
board was entitled, without allowing a shareholder vote, to decide that ques-
tion by itself.
75
The chancery court held that Time's directors were entitled to view Para-
mount's offer as a Unocal "threat." The court rejected, without any systematic
analysis, the EMH view that the Paramount offer should be viewed as superior
to the Warner combination because it was higher than the market price of
Time's stock that resulted from the announcement of the merger and was also
higher than the price the company's investment banker predicted its stock
would reach immediately after the merger.7 6 Although one would have ex-
pected the court to then examine in detail whether the Time board was rea-
sonable in believing that the combination with Warner was more valuable
than Paramount's offer, the court sanctioned the Time board's conduct on the
ground that the Warner combination was a good-faith business decision pre-
dating the Paramount offer.7 This focus on subjective good faith seems con-
trary to Unocal's objective standard of review and the court's own ruling that
Unocal, rather than the traditional business judgement rule, applied once the
board took defensive action in response to the Paramount offer.
The court held that recasting the form of the merger transaction, which
effectively precluded the Paramount offer,78 was a reasonable response under
the second prong of Unocal because it protected the combination with
Warner. 70 Since the primary threat presented by the offer was that it would
prevent the combination with Warner, this holding seems tautological. The
court believed that the denial of shareholder choice was not a problem because
shareholders have no statutory right to vote on whether a company should
proceed with a tender offer. 80 This view in effect sanctions all preclusive defen-
sive tactics, such as the poison pill, that can be adopted without a shareholder
vote.
The Delaware Supreme Court affirmed. It agreed with the chancery court
75. Id. at 93,276-78.
76. The court did cite two examples in which the predictions of a target company board that
the company would ultimately be worth more than a pending tender offer came to pass. Id. at
93,277. However, if the stock market price is the best predictor of a company's value, then half of
all takeover targets should do better in the future than their current market prices and half should
do worse. The fact that two target companies improved on their market prices and exceeded an
offeror's price is largely irrelevant.
77. Id. at 93,282-83.
78. Paramount conditioned its tender offer on abandonment of the combination with Warner.
Id. at 93,271.
79. Id. at 93,283-84.
80. Id. at 93,281-82. The chancery court limited its prior precedents pertaining to shareholder
choice in tender offers through its dictum in TW Services, Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989). See supra note 52.
The court viewed the Warner combination as a way of continuing Time's business rather than as a
sale-type alternative to Paramount's offer. Paramount, [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) at 93,282-83.
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that the Time board's conduct was subject to Unocal scrutiny. However, al-
though the supreme court reaffirmed its position that a board need not defer to
the stock market on the issue of value, 1 the court rejected the view that, to
pass Unocal muster, Time's board was required to produce evidence that the
Warner combination was more valuable than the Paramount offer. The court
noted that, in addition to potential financial inadequacy, the Paramount offer
represented a threat to the Time board's strategic business plan. In the court's
view, the Time board was entitled to take steps to protect this plan without
regard to comparative values. 82 The court emphasized that, since the Time
board acted in good faith after a detailed investigation, its judgment should
not be second-guessed by the courts. Applying Unocal's second prong, the
court held that, since preserving the Warner deal was a legitimate purpose,
precluding the Paramount offer was permissible. The court noted that share-
holders had no right to choose with respect to Paramount's offer because
tender offer decisions, like all other corporate decisions, were initially within
the board's purview.8
On its face, Paramount suggests that the Unocal standard is indistinguish-
able from the traditional business judgment rule.8 Target company directors
can seemingly prevail whenever they seek to protect a business plan adopted in
good faith after reasonable investigation. A bidder cannot force the board even
to consider whether a present sale at the offer price would generate a higher
value for shareholders. However, just as the chancery court's precedents,
which endorsed shareholder choice in sweeping language, came to be restricted
by their facts, Paramount may be a more limited precedent than its language
suggests. Paramount involved a preexisting strategic combination of many
years' planning rather than an attempt simply to preclude a takeover bid to
guarantee the independence of a target company. The Delaware Supreme
Court's decision in Paramount may be viewed as holding only that a board
need not abandon a preexisting deal, and may take the steps necessary to pro-
tect such a deal, once a tender offer is made.85
81. Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d, 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1990); see
supra note 28 and accompanying text (citing the Delaware courts' apparent rejection of the EMH
theory in the context of tender offers).
82. Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1151-53.
83. Id. at 1154-55. Specifically referring to Interco, the supreme court noted that, to the extent
certain chancery court opinions granted the shareholders a right to choose in the tender offer
context, "we hereby reject such approach as not in keeping with a proper Unocal analysis." Id. at
1153.
84. See Marc I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Picture Horror Show,
16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 19 (1991). The Delaware Supreme Court recently emphasized the similar-
ities between the Unocal standard and the business judgment rule. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575
A.2d 1131, 1145 n.29 (Del. 1990).
85. Lisa A. Duda, Comment, Paramount Communications, Inc. v. Time Inc.: A Decision of
Paramount Significance?, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 141, 184 (1991). Much of the supreme court's
language lends itself to this limitation. The supreme court noted that it "purposely detailed the
evidence of the Time Board's deliberative approach, beginning in 1983-84, to expand itself" and
that "Time's decision in 1988 to combine with Warner was made only after what could be fairly
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D. Conclusion
The courts have squarely rejected the EMH view and held that market
price is not dispositive of target company value. Without any systematic analy-
sis, the courts have taken the position that a premium tender offer can be
inadequate and, using the language of Unocal, a "threat" to the target com-
pany and its shareholders. On the issue of which target constituency should
make the economic choice posed by tender offers, the courts have come down
squarely on the side of the target company's board. Although the rigor of judi-
cial review remains to be established by later cases, the courts have suggested
that judicial review of preclusive defensive tactics will be deferential.
II. AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF DEFENSIVE TACTICS
This part argues that, even if EMH is accurate, preclusive defensive tactics
may still be justified in individual cases to enable the target company's board
to negotiate with the original bidder or to conduct an auction.86 This part also
argues that a rigorous analysis supports the courts' decision to take proof on
whether a premium offer captures the intrinsic value of the target company as
a going concern.
A. The Efficient Markets Hypothesis
1. Valuing Investments
The first step in valuing a company is to estimate the returns the company
will pay out in the future. The estimated returns must be discounted to ac-
count for the time value of money, since the returns will be earned in the
future, and for the risk or variation in the expected returns.87 A corollary prin-
ciple is that investors expect to be compensated for taking risk. Risk is divided
by economists into that which is peculiar to individual companies (alpha risk)
and that which varies in conjunction with the market as a whole (beta risk).
Economists hypothesize that alpha risk can be eliminated by diversifying one's
investment portfolio. Because alpha risk can be eliminated through diversifica-
characterized as an exhaustive appraisal of Time's future as a corporation." Paramount, 571 A.2d
at 1151-52. The supreme court emphasized that "Time's responsive action to Paramount's tender
offer was not aimed at 'cramming down' on its shareholders a management-sponsored alternative,
but rather had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing transaction in an altered form."
Id. at 1154-55.
86. If a target company board opposes a takeover bid as inadequate, it can have three theories
on why the offer price does not adequately reflect target company value: (a) the target company is
more valuable as an independent entity; (b) the board can negotiate a higher price from the
original offeror; or (c) the board can sell the company for a higher price after an auction. Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 21, at 260. Only the first of these justifications is antithetical to EMH.
See discussion infra part lI.B.
87. See THOMAS E. COPELAND & J. FRED WESTON, FINANCIAL THEORY AND CORPORATE POL-
icy 77-108, 841-43 (3d ed. 1988); RONALD J. GILSON, THE LAW AND FINANCE OF CORPORATE
ACQUISITIONS 68-124 (1986).
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tion, economists predict that the market will not compensate an investor for
bearing it. Beta risk, by contrast, is a fact of investing life. It cannot be elimi-
nated, and the market must compensate investors for bearing it.89
Compensation in accordance with beta risk is usually expressed as a func-
tion of the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM"), which postulates that the
expected return of an investment portfolio (ERP) is equal to the risk-free rate
of return (RF) plus the beta (Bp) of the portfolio multiplied by the difference
between the expected rate of return on the market portfolio (ERM) and the
risk-free rate of return. In symbols, ERP = RF + BP(ERM - RF).'8 CAPM
predicts that a portfolio's expected rate of return varies linearly with the port-
folio's beta and, since the other symbols represent observable constants, varies
only with the portfolio's beta. 90
2. Three Forms of EMH
If capital markets are efficient, it is impossible to make a profit speculating
in securities because the current market price is the best predictor of future
market prices. Capital markets will be efficient if the following criteria are
met: all investors are rational utility maximizers; market trading involves no
transaction costs; the securities markets are perfectly competitive; and infor-
mation is costlessly and instantaneously available to all investors. 91
There are three forms of EMH: weak, semi-strong, and strong. According to
the weak form, the market price of a security reflects all information regard-
ing the past trading prices of that security. According to the semi-strong form,
the market price of a security reflects all publicly available information about
that security. The strong form posits that the market price of a security re-
flects all information about that security whether or not the information is
public.9"
If EMH is correct, takeovers should be motivated by factors that make the
assets of the target company more valuable in the hands of the bidder. As a
88. See, e.g., COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 193-239; GILSON, supra note 87, at
125-55.
89. GILSON, supra note 87, at 138. Thus, if the risk-free rate of return is 5% and the expected
return on the market portfolio is 14%, CAPM predicts that a company with a beta of two (i.e., a
company whose returns are twice as volatile as the market as a whole) will have an expected
return of 23%.
90. Studies have tended to verify the first but not the second of these predictions. See Jeffrey
N. Gordon & Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Re-
search, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 761, 782 (1985). However, Professors Fama and French of the Uni-
versity of Chicago Business School recently disclosed the results of a study that challenges the
core of CAPM. Fama and French analyzed the performance of thousands of stock over a fifty-
year period and concluded that little, if any, correlation exists between a company's beta and the
return on its stock. According to Fama and French, "long-term returns depend not on beta, but on
company size and price-to-book ratios." Eric N. Berg, A Study Shakes Confidence in the Vola-
tile-Stock Theory, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 18, 1992, at Cl, C6 (nat'l ed.).
91. See. e.g., COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 331; GILSON, supra note 87, at 156.




result, the bidder is able to pay a premium over the existing market price. 3
The two most common explanations for the value-enhancing nature of take-
over bids are that the bidder will be able to manage the target's assets more
efficiently or that the combination will create synergies not available to the
target company as an independent entity. 9" According to this paradigm, take-
over defense represents a social cost that prevents the market for corporate
control from acting as a check on inefficient or disloyal management." Take-
over defense also prevents assets from being transferred to their most valuable
uses.
99
93. Of course, bidders may simply be incorrect in thinking that a takeover will result in in-
creased value. Studies show that successful acquisitions are either neutral from the perspective of
the bidder's shareholders or result in a small loss in value. See Black, supra note 2, at 602-04;
John C. Coffee, The Uncertain Case for Takeover Reform: An Essay on Shareholders, Stake-
holders and Bust-Ups, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 435, 442-43; George W. Dent, Jr., Unprofitable Merg-
ers: Toward a Market-Based Legal Response, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 777, 778-79 (1986); Lipton,
supra note 56, at 26 & n. 115; Stout, supra note 2, at 1262.
One commentator has suggested that the takeover premium reflects the elasticity in the supply
curve for securities. According to this theory, the market price represents the worth of a single
share of stock to that shareholder most willing to sell. To the extent that a bidder wishes to
purchase a controlling interest, the bidder must be willing to pay a price that reflects the value
placed on the stock by more optimistic shareholders. According to this theory, the premium does
not necessarily reflect social gain. Rather, it merely reflects the value placed on the stock by the
last shareholder whose sale is necessary to give the bidder a controlling interest. Id. at 1259-75.
94. See, e.g., GILSON, supra note 87, at 371-445; id. at 34-56,(Supp. 1990). But see Edward S.
Herman & Louis Lowenstein, The Efficiency Effects of Hostile Takeovers, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS,
AND TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE HOSTILE TAKEOVER 211, 211-40 (John C. Coffee et al. eds.,
1988) (arguing, based on accounting data, that during the time period from 1981-83 targets were
on average more profitable than bidders, and bidders saw their profitability decline post-
acquisition).
If EMH is correct, premium takeover bids should not be made if the bidder cannot enhance the
value of the target company. For example, diversification at the company level should not moti-
vate takeover bids because diversification in an efficient market is better practiced at the share-
holder portfolio level. See, e.g., GILSON, supra note 87, at 341-70. Similarly, whether the purchase
method of accounting will apply to the takeover should not affect the transaction because account-
ing methodology does not affect the actual value of the target company and an efficient market
should recognize this fact. See. e.g., id. at 257-340; id. at 31-33 (Supp. 1990). Nevertheless, such
factors matter to sophisticated participants in the business world. AT&T recently changed the
form of its $7.4 billion acquisition of NCR to qualify for the purchase method of accounting for
the transaction. Allison L. Cowan, A.T.& T. Alters Merger To Win Audit Ruling, N.Y. TIMES.
July 4, 1991, at D22.
Certain motivations for takeovers reflect gains to the bidder but not social gains. Bidders may
seek a controlling stake to redistribute value from minority shareholders to themselves or from
other corporate constituencies, such as bondholders or employees, to themselves. Bidders may seek
to augment their market power in a particular field. They may be influenced by tax considera-
tions. The commentators have been skeptical of such motives. See, e.g., GILSON, supra note 87, at
445-98; id. at 58-59, 72-120 (Supp. 1990).
95. E.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1174-80.
96. E.g., Amanda Aquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir.)
(Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
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B. Defensive Tactics Assuming the Validity of EMH
This section assumes that EMH is accurate, that the market price of a tar-
get company's stock is determinative of value, and that premium takeover bids
are value-enhancing. Defensive tactics may still contribute value to target
company shareholders in individual cases.
1. Negotiation
Assume that the actual value and market price of a corporation's stock is
$100 per share. A bidder offers $105 per share for the entire company. The
bidder is able to offer a premium because synergies will result from the combi-
nation. Should the bidder's offer be accepted?
The hypothetical does not give enough facts to formulate an answer. It may
be that synergies envisioned by the bidder make the target company's stock
worth $200 per share in the bidder's hands. In this event, the bidder has ap-
propriated 95 % of the synergy gains, which is unfair to the target company's
shareholders. The target company's shareholders would prefer the bidder's of-
fer to remaining independent. However, their first choice would be to negotiate
with the bidder to ensure a fairer division of the synergy gains.
If the target company were owned by a single shareholder, that shareholder
could do the bargaining himself. However, because shareholdings are dispersed
and concerted action is expensive, shareholders in most public companies must
rely on the board to serve as bargaining agent.97 Defensive tactics such as the
poison pill force the bidder to negotiate with the target company's board. If all
parties bargain in good faith, the most rational outcome would be a sale of the
target company for approximately $150 per share."'
There is, however, a danger that the target company's board may refuse to
negotiate in good faith. The directors may use defensive tactics for the purpose
of maintaining target company independence, and their own positions, rather
than to obtain negotiating leverage. This result would cost the target com-
pany's shareholders money and prevent the target company's assets from being
shifted to their most valuable use. As a consequence, one commentator who
has argued that tender offer results should approximate those that would be
obtained if target companies were owned by individual shareholders has also
argued that the target company's board should not have access to preclusive
defensive tactics for negotiating purposes."
This position involves unjustifiable overkill. If the choice were between a per
97. For two articles supporting the use of the target company board as a negotiating agent, see
David D. Haddock et al., Property Rights in Assets and Resistance to Tender Offers, 73 VA. L.
REv. 701 (1987); Dale A. Oesterle, Target Managers as Negotiating Agents for Target Share-
holders in Tender Offers: A Reply to the Passivity Thesis, 71 CORNELL L. REV. 53 (1985).
98. This analysis assumes that there are no other bidders for the target company and that no
other target companies are substitutes from the bidder's perspective.
99. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Sole Owner Standard for Takeover Policy, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 197, 215-16 (1988).
1992]
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
se rule allowing preclusive defensive tactics and a per se rule proscribing such
tactics, we would weigh the benefits and costs to target company shareholders
resulting from negotiation and impose the appropriate rule. This balance is an
empirical question. The evidence does not currently support a per se ban on
preclusive defensive tactics.10
However, there is an intermediate position. We can examine case by case
whether target company directors were justified in resisting particular offers.
Since the benefits of giving target company directors the power to negotiate
are potentially large, case-by-case litigation appears superior to a per se rule
against preclusive defensive tactics.10 1 If the problem is that the Unocal stan-
dard of review is too lenient as currently applied, the best solution is to im-
prove the standard of review.
10 2
The courts have suggested that target company directors may use defensive
tactics to further negotiation but should abandon such tactics once negotia-
tions have concluded and allow the shareholders to consider the best available
third-party offer.' 03 As will be demonstrated, this procedure is inappropriate
because shareholders do not have a fair opportunity to choose to accept or
reject a tender offer.' 0 ' In addition, if the rule were that defensive tactics had
to be withdrawn after the conclusion of negotiations, bidders would have no
incentive to negotiate. Using defensive tactics to further negotiation is effective
only if the board has the ability convincingly to threaten preclusion. To hold
otherwise would be equivalent to giving labor unions the right to bargain but
100. See discussion infra part lI.D.
101. Negotiation need not involve communication with the bidder by the target company's
board. Employing preclusive defensive tactics is a form of negotiation that has often caused bid-
ders to raise their prices. E.g., Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147-49
(Del. 1990) (resistance by target company caused bidder to raise its offer from $175 per share to
$200 per share); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1339 (Del. 1987)
(resistance by target company caused bidder to raise its offer from $95 per share to $105 per
share); Revlon, Inc., v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holding, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 176-77 (Del. 1986)
(poison pill rights plan caused bidder to raise its offer from $42 per share to $53 per share prior to
commencement of an auction); Grand Metro. Pub. Co. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1052 &
n.4 (Del. Ch. 1988) (poison pill caused bidder to raise its offer from $60 per share to $63 per
share); City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 792-94 (Del. Ch. 1988) (poison pill
caused bidder to raise its offer from $64 per share to $74 per share); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc.
v. Evans (Macmillan 1), 552 A.2d 1227, 1234-37 (Del. Ch. 1988) (resistance by target company
caused bidder to raise its offer from $64 per share to $73 per share); see also Sutton Holding
Corp. v. DeSoto, Inc., [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,964, at 95,398-99
(Del. Ch. Feb. 5, 1990) (finding that target directors failed to meet their Unocal burden, but
refusing to enjoin poison pill to allow target directors to force the bidder to improve on its initial
offer); Schwartz, supra note 6, at 172-74 (noting that target company shareholders often benefit
from the takeover process to the extent that the bidder is forced to bid against itself). Whether the
boards in these cases ultimately accepted the bidder's highest offer is irrelevant. The cases demon-
strate that negotiation is a tool of great potential value to target shareholders. It is the function of
judicial review to decide whether the target company's board has acted reasonably in rejecting the
bidder's highest offer.
102. See discussion infra part V.B.
103. See, e.g., Revlon, 506 A.2d at 180-81; Interco, 551 A.2d at 798.
104. See discussion infra part III.
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not to strike.
2. Auctions
In some cases, the target company's best strategy is to conduct an auction.
An auction may generate the highest possible price for target company share-
holders and force bidders to give target company shareholders their fair share
of any gains flowing from the acquisition. If the bidding is competitive and the
target company offers unique value to the bidders, an auction may even suc-
ceed in capturing the lion's share of acquisition gains for the target company's
shareholders. The courts have upheld the use of defensive tactics to give the
target company's board time to conduct a proper auction.
10 5
Some commentators have suggested that facilitating an auction is the only
legitimate use of preclusive defensive tactics.' 06 However, the auction alterna-
105. See, e.g., CRTF Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, 683 F. Supp. 422, 439 (S.D.N.Y. 1988);
BNS, Inc. v. Koppers Co., 683 F. Supp. 458, 475-76 (D. Del. 1988); Doskocil Cos. v. Griggy,
C.A. No. 10,095 (Del. Ch. Oct. 7, 1988); Nomad Acquisition Corp. v. Damon Corp., [1988-89
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,040 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1988); Facet Enters. v.
Prospect Group, Inc., C.A. No. 9746 (Del. Ch. Apr. 15, 1988).
106. Gilson, supra note 13, at 868-75; Louis Lowenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Cor-
porate Control and the Demise of the Business Judgment Rule, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 65, 69
(1989). Other commentators oppose this limited position and argue for a total ban on defensive
tactics. These commentators argue that the gains to target company shareholders resulting from
negotiations or auctions decrease the benefits to initial bidders. Some bidders will, therefore, be
unwilling to incur the search costs necessary to identify value-enhancing takeovers, and fewer such
takeovers will occur. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1175-80; Alan Schwartz, Search
Theory and the Tender Offer Auction, 2 J.L. EcON. & ORG. 229, 229-30 (1986). Although the
cost of deterred offers is a difficult empirical question, an intuitive analysis suggests that the cost
is not substantial. If negotiations and auctions are allowed, many initial bidders will still succeed
at a price that covers search costs. If the initial bidder loses out to a higher bidder, it typically will
have purchased approximately 5% of the target company shares, the threshold for certain federal
disclosure requirements, prior to launching its bid and will make a substantial profit by selling
these shares to the victorious bidder. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Compet-
ing Tender Offers, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1028, 1034-38 (1985) [hereinafter Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers]; Ronald J. Gilson, Seeking Competitive Bids Versus Pure
Passivity in Tender Offer Defense, 35 STAN. L. REV. 51, 52-62 (1982).
Opponents of negotiations and auctions also argue that gains to target company's shareholders
are irrelevant because they merely represent a redistribution of value from the bidder's sharehold-
ers to the target company's shareholders. Shareholders with diversified portfolios, these commen-
tators argue, do not care ex ante about the distribution of gains from value-enhancing takeover
bids. They care only about the total volume of such bids. See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R.
Fischel, Auctions and Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8-9 (1982). However,
some empirical evidence suggests that individual investors tend to hold portfolios that are not
diversified. See MARSHALL E. BLUME & IRWIN FRIEND, THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE INDIVID-
UAL INVESTOR 46-50, 117-20 (1978). Although the market may not compensate them for the
extra risk they have taken, the traditional legal view has been that directors owe a fiduciary duty
to their own shareholders, not to the market as a whole. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for
Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Reply and Extension, 35 STAN. L. REV. 23, 29 (1982);
John C. Coffee, Regulating the Market for Corporate Control: A Critical Assessment of the
Tender Offer's Role in Corporate Governance, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1145, 1216-21 (1984); cf.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E)(2) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (empowering, but not requiring,
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tive does not eliminate the need for preclusive defensive tactics as an aid to
negotiation. After an initial bid is made, there is no guarantee that an auction
will develop."0 7 Other bidders may not be able to realize the same acquisition
gains as the original bidder. If the initial bidder is the most efficient acquiror,
other potential bidders, realizing that they cannot win at a price that is appro-
priate for them, may refuse to bid. In addition, the initial bidder has a sub-
stantial timing advantage over other bidders. New bidders may not be able to
do research or obtain financing quickly enough to compete with the initial
bidder.' 08
There is also no guarantee that, if an auction develops, the winning bid will
be at an appropriate price. Assume that a bidder offers $120 per share for a
corporation whose stock is selling at $100 per share and that a combination
with the bidder will create synergies of $40 per share. A second bidder, who
can realize synergies of $100 per share, bids $125 per share and wins the
auction. Just as the target company's board would not have accepted $125 per
share from the second bidder if it had made the only bid, it should not accept
$125 per share simply because an auction has occurred. In either case, the
target company's board should hold out for something close to $150 per share.
C. Defensive Tactics as a Challenge to EMH
More controversial is the use of preclusive defensive tactics to preserve the
independence of the target company. Critics of defensive tactics that further
independence rely on the market as the dispositive measure of value. 109 The
empirical evidence does not justify their faith in the market.
1. Evidence on the Weak Form of EMH
The empirical evidence supports the weak form of EMH. The market ought
to exhibit a strong tendency toward weak-form efficiency because information
about past stock prices is widely available at low cost." 0 Studies of the weak
form of EMH have tended to show that trading strategies based on past stock
prices have not been profitable."' However, the validity of the weak form of
directors to consider the interests of a variety of nonshareholder interests, including the national
economy).
107. See David W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 153, 194-95 (1986) ("Since the vast majority of tender offers are not competitive, there is
usually no auction at all.").
108. See Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 106, at
1036.
109. See, e.g., Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1165-68; Schwartz, supra note 6, at
188-89.
110. See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70
VA. L. REV. 549, 568-69 (1984).
111. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 391-92; KENNETH D. GARBADE, SECURITIES
MARKETS 241-49 (1982); JAMES H. LORIE & MARY T. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEO-
RIES AND EVIDENCE 75-83 (1973); Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work. 25 J. FIN. 383, 389-96 (1970); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
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EMH is of little relevance. It is undisputed that bidders and target companies
rely on more information than past prices to arrive at values.
2. Evidence on the Semi-Strong Form of EMH
There is reason to question the semi-strong form of EMH. Public companies
are required to make available to investors a large amount of financial infor-
mation. However, much of that material is filed with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and is not provided directly to investors. Although not
readily accessible to the man on the street, sophisticated market professionals,
who control a large percentage of trading activity, have low-cost access to such
information. Their trading might cause the market price to reflect most pub-
licly available information very quickly.112
The systematic evidence on the semi-strong form of EMH is mixed. Re-
searchers have tested the semi-strong form by examining whether sophisti-
cated investors can devise profitable trading strategies based on the public an-
nouncement of material information. Many tests confirm that sophisticated
investors cannot earn significant profits by racing public announcements to
market.' 13 Researchers have also examined whether sophisticated investors,
such as mutual fund managers, can make trading profits based on their supe-
rior analysis of public information. Much empirical evidence suggests that so-
phisticated investors cannot obtain significant profits through analysis of pub-
lic information.1
4
However, the evidence is not uniform. Some tests of the market's ability to
absorb public information contradict the semi-strong form of EMH." 5 More-
110, at 555 n.25; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 772-75.
112. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 569-72.
113. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 361-83, 392; GARBADE, supra note 111, at
249-59; Fama, supra note 11, at 383, 404-09; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 555 n.26;
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 834-37.
114. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 383-90, 392; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra
note 90, at 838-41; Michael C. Jensen, The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-
1964, 23 J. FiN. 389, 415 (1968) (concluding that mutual fund managers do not outperform the
market as a whole by an amount sufficient to cover fees and expenses). There is reason to question
these professional investor studies. There must be some benchmark against which to measure the
trading profits of professional investors given the betas of their investment portfolios. Otherwise, it
is impossible to tell whether they made a profit that sufficiently reflected the risk level of the
portfolio. The professional investor studies use CAPM as the appropriate benchmark. As commen-
tators have noted, to the extent CAPM is open to question, so are the studies themselves. See
Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 782-86. Moreover, questions regarding the validity of
CAPM taint EMH. But see id. at 781. If capital markets are efficient, CAPM ought to be a
correct description of risk compensation. To the extent that alpha risk factors influence compensa-
tion, they do so because such factors as transaction and information costs inhibit full diversifica-
tion or because investors have not recognized the benefits of full diversification. Each of these
explanations contradicts a premise of EMH. See discussion supra part II.A.2.
115. See Ray Ball, Anomalies in Relationships Between Securities Yields and Yield-Surro-
gates, 6 J. FIN. EcoN. 103, 118 (1978) (concluding that investors receive excess returns after the
announcement of earnings increases); Guy Charest, Split Information, Stock Returns and Market
Efficiency-1, 6 J. FIN. EcON. 265, 279 (1978) (concluding that investors receive excess returns for
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over, the supportive studies prove both too much and too little. They prove too
much because they imply that professional investors' research activities are not
justified. If the market price reflects all publicly available information, profes-
sional investors should not incur the cost of research and analysis. This para-
digm leads to a paradox. The research of professional investors is what makes
the market efficient in the semi-strong sense, but this efficient status should
lead them all to cease research activities." '
It seems more likely that the market establishes an equilibrium point for the
acquisition and analysis of information. This equilibrium ought to be reached
where researchers earn at least, but no more than, a competitive return. The
implication is that the market never reflects all publicly available information
because, contrary to EMH's assumptions, information is not costlessly availa-
ble. '1 7 Although an equilibrium may be reached that makes it unprofitable to
engage in market-wide research, it may be profitable for researchers with ex-
pertise in particular areas to identify companies that have been inefficiently
priced or undervalued by the market.
The tests supportive of the semi-strong form of EMH also prove too little
because they are to some extent circular. The supportive tests show that pro-
fessional investors cannot make trading profits by outguessing the market. Ac-
cording to EMH, if a stock is selling on the market for $50 per share, the best
estimate of the stock's future value is $50 per share. If a professional investor
buys at $50 believing the stock is really worth $60 and later sells at $50, his
transaction would be cited as confirmation of the validity of the semi-strong
form of EMH. However, this analysis assumes that the market price at the
time of sale is the best indicator of the stock's value at that time. It may be
that the investor was entirely correct and that his ratable interest in the future
profits of the company justified a $60 present value at the time of purchase." 8
The systematic empirical evidence regarding the semi-strong form of EMH is
up to three months following announcements of stock splits); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
110, at 626 & n.205; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 841-46; William K.S. Wang, Some
Arguments that the Stock Market Is Not Efficient. 19 U.C. DAvIs L. REV. 341 (1986) (collecting
studies); Ross L. Watts, Systematic "Abnormal" Returns After Quarterly Earnings Announce-
ments, 6 J. FIN. ECON. 127, 139-43 (1978) (concluding that the market takes over two quarters to
adjust to earnings announcements); see also Elroy Dimson & Paul Marsh, An Analysis of Bro-
kers' and Analysts' Unpublished Forecasts of UK Stock Returns, 39 J. FIN. 1257 (1984) (con-
cluding that trading based on analysts' forecasts over a one-year period would have led to signifi-
cant trading profits).
116. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 786.
117. See Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 207; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 786-96.
There is also some reason to question the EMH assumption that all investors are perfectly ra-
tional. Valuation depends on predictions about the future translated into present value. Sociologi-
cal evidence demonstrates that the process by which people "assign subjective probabilities is sub-
ject to a variety of biases that can lead to verifiably incorrect estimates and, ultimately, decisions."
GILSON, supra note 87, at 99; see Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncer-
tainty: Heuristics and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124 (1974).
118. See Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 801-02 (noting that the studies assume that
any misvaluation in the price of a security is resolved by the time of the second trade).
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not sufficient to cause the courts to accept the market price of a target com-
pany stock as determinative of value. 119
There is also strong intuitive evidence that undercuts the semi-strong form
of EMH. On October 19, 1987, the Dow Jones Industrial Index fell 508
points, or 22.6% .120 Yet, no piece of information sufficient to cause a decline
of that magnitude was disclosed on October 19.121 As a consequence, the trad-
ing on Black Monday seems to have been caused by purely speculative con-
cerns. Traders sold in droves on Black Monday because they believed others
would sell and drive stock prices down. Black Monday suggests that stock
prices are often set by concerns other than predictions about future income
flows discounted for time and risk. 22
Black Monday is inconsistent with EMH unless EMH is sharply limited.
EMH may be viewed as a prediction about future market prices rather than
real values.123 So limited, the semi-strong form of EMH asserts only that the
119. See Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 207-10; Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 824-30.
120. Lawrence J. DeMaria, Stocks Plunge 508 Points, A Drop of 22.6%; 604 Million Volume
Nearly Doubles Record, N.Y. TIMES. Oct. 20, 1987, at Al.
121. A presidential task force concluded that the market decline was triggered by the unexpect-
edly high trade deficit, which raised interest rates, and proposed tax legislation, which made cer-
tain takeovers less likely. The task force concluded that once selling began, it quickly spun out of
control and placed the equity market in free fall as a consequence of a liquidity crisis and a lack
of coordination among the stock, index futures, and options markets. REPORT OF THE PRESIDEN-
TIAL TASK FORCE ON MARKET MECHANISMS at v to vi, 69 (1988). In other words, two events that
should have led to a small decline in an efficient market led to a catastrophic decline as investors
panicked and raced each other to sell.
122. See Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal for Legisla-
tion, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 288 (1983) (noting that market professionals are concerned with
such factors as market momentum); Douglas R. Sease, Is the High-Priced Stock Market Really
Overvalued?, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 1991, at Cl (quoting the opinion of one market analyst that
at the beginning of a business cycle "interest rates and market dynamics are much more impor-
tant than looking at value"); Robert J. Shiller, Do Stock Prices Move Too Much To Be Justified
by Subsequent Changes in Dividends?, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 421, 433-35 (1981) (questioning
whether the volatility of market prices is consistent with EMH); Robert J. Shiller, Fashions,
Fads, and Bubbles in Financial Markets, in KNIGHTS, RAIDERS & TARGETS: THE IMPACT OF THE
HOSTILE TAKEOVER 56 (John C. Coffee et al. eds., 1988) ("(T]here is evidence that fashions,
fads, or bubbles do importantly influence prices of speculative assets.").
123. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 339 ("'Professional investment may be
likened to newspaper competitions in which the competitors have to pick out the six prettiest faces
from a hundred photographs, the prize being awarded to the competitor whose choice most nearly
corresponds to the average preferences of the competitors as a whole.'" (quoting JOHN MAYNARD
KEYNES, THE GENERAL THEORY OF EMPLOYMENT, INTEREST, AND MONEY 156 (1936))); GILSON,
supra note 87, at 2 (Supp. 1990) (noting that EMH predicts only that "information available to
securities traders will not support profitable trading strategies," not that "share prices are well
informed estimates of the present value of the cash flows expected from underlying corporate
assets"); Gordon & Kornhauser, supra note 90, at 827 (noting that EMH claims that the market
is speculatively efficient, not that it is allocationally efficient); Lowenstein, supra note 122, at 275
(noting that EMH theorists define value as "the value shares would have in trading transac-
tions"); Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender Offers and the "Nancy Reagan
Defense": May Target Boards "Just Say No"? Should They Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP.
L. 377, 415 (1990) (noting that the stock market is efficient in an informational but not a funda-
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current market price of a security contains all publicly available information
about its future trading prices. When EMH is restricted in this way, it has no
legitimacy as the basis for legal takeover policy. Target company directors
could plausibly assert that their company is undervalued and that a given pre-
mium bid does not adequately capture future returns discounted for time and
risk. If directors can offer sufficient proof on this issue, takeover defense is
justified as a means of preventing the bidder from stealing from target com-
pany shareholders that value which exists but has not yet been recognized by
the market.124
3. Evidence on the Strong Form of EMH
The empirical evidence on the strong form of EMH is damaging to those
who support a per se rule against preclusive defensive tactics. 12 5 Studies
demonstrate that corporate insiders, as well as specialists on the major ex-
changes (who possess nonpublic information about unexecuted trades), out-
perform the market as a whole when trading. 2 6 These studies imply that: in-
mental valuation sense); Wang, supra note 115, at 344 (noting that EMH "does not imply that
prices reflect intrinsic or fundamental value").
124. There is evidence that the market systematically undervalues certain types of assets. For
example, shares in closed-fund investment companies, holding companies with large investments in
marketable securities, and natural resource companies trade at a discount to their underlying asset
values. Reinier Kraakman, Taking Discounts Seriously: The Implications of "Discounted" Share
Prices as an Acquisition Motive, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 891, 901-06 (1988). Moreover, there is
reason to believe that such discounts appear in the market generally. See id. at 907-14. Kraakman
offers two explanations for the phenomenon of discounting. Either the market discounts share
prices because traders believe that management will inefficiently invest future profits or the mar-
ket has made a valuation error based on "noisy" trading. Id. at 897-98. The first of these explana-
tions is simply a variant on the inefficient management hypothesis and counsels against preclusive
defensive tactics. The second suggests that the bidder's premium may be nothing more than an
attempt to capitalize on an undervalued company and suggests that target management should
oppose inadequate offers. See id. at 933-39; see also Andrei Shliefer & Lawrence H. Summers,
The Noise Approach to Finance, 4 J. EcoN. PERSP. 19 (1990) (arguing that the market is ineffi-
cient because investors are not fully rational and arbitrage is limited).
125. See Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers: A Last (?)
Reply, 2 J.L. EcoN. & ORG. 253, 259 (1986) ("[llt is generally believed that market prices do
not fully reflect all [inside] information.").
126. See COPELAND & WESTON, supra note 87, at 376-77; Jerome B. Baesel & Garry R. Stein,
The Value of Information: Inferences from the Profitability of Insider Trading, 14 J. FIN. &
QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 553, 557-69 (1979); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 556 n.27;
Jeffrey F. Jaffe, Special Information and Insider Trading, 47 J. Bus. 410, 424, 427-28 (1974);
Arthur J. Keown & John M. Pinkerton, Merger Announcements and Insider Trading Activity: An
Empirical Investigation, 36 J. FIN. 855 (1981); James H. Lorie & Victor Niederhoffer, Predictive
and Statistical Properties of Insider Trading, II J.L. & ECON. 35, 52-53 (1968); Victor
Niederhoffer & M.F.M. Osborne, Market Making and Reversal on the Stock Exchange, 61 J.
AM. STAT. Ass'N 897 (1966). The very act of trading on the part of insiders may cause the market
to incorporate the information they possess or at least to incorporate its import. Corporate insiders
are required to report their trading activity. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a) (1988). The public may well react
to such information by mimicking the actions of the insiders, on the theory that the insiders know
something that the public does not. To this extent, trading by insiders becomes partly reflected in
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siders are trading on the basis of material nonpublic information, in which
case the strong form of EMH is inaccurate and their conduct is illegal;127
insiders have a superior ability to analyze publicly available information, 128 in
which case the semi-strong form of EMH is again called into question; or
both. Whatever the explanation, these studies demonstrate that target com-
pany directors can credibly claim that their opinion on value is superior to the
market's. The courts should be willing to receive evidence on the target com-
pany's intrinsic value and should not defer to the market.
D. Evidence on the Impact of Successful Takeover Defense
Leaving aside the direct evidence on the validity of EMH, EMH proponents
have argued that studies on the wealth effects of tender offer defense demon-
strate that preclusive defensive tactics should be prohibited.12 9 The evidence
does not support this view. A study by the investment banking firm of Kidder,
Peabody & Co. demonstrates that a majority of target companies that de-
feated hostile tender offers between 1973 and 1984 and remained independent
for at least one year saw their discounted stock prices exceed the offer price.13 0
Thus, the Kidder study supports the view that defensive tactics should not be
precluded on economic efficiency grounds.
market price, although more slowly and less extensively than with respect to the weak and semi-
strong forms of EMH. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 110, at 572-79.
127. See, e.g., SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969). Of course, directors who do not trade have no obligation to, and
may legitimately prefer not to, disclose all material information about their companies. See Basic,
Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231 (1988); Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848; discussion
infra part IV.B. As a consequence, there is every reason to believe that directors often have better
information than the market.
128. See Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 1 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (noting that target company directors may
have "understood better than the public market for the firm's shares what the value of their firm
was"), affid, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990); Stout, supra note 2, at 1271-72.
129. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 500-02 (7th
Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989).
130. See KIDDER, PEABODY & CO., SUMMARY OF DEFEATED HOSTILE TENDER OFFERS: 1973-
1984 (1984). The Kidder study discounts the target company stock price back to the time of the
offer using the rate of inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index, as the discount rate.
The Kidder study has been criticized for relying on the Consumer Price Index, rather than the
rate of growth of the S&P 500, as the source of the discount rate. Two studies using Kidder's data
conclude that target company stock values did not on the average exceed the tender offer consider-
ation within two years of the offer if the offer price is assumed to grow at the rate of the S&P
500. Frank H. Easterbrook & Gregg A. Jarrell, Do Targets Gain from Defeating Tender Offers?,
59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 277, 287-91 (1984); John A. Pound, Takeover Defeats Hurt Stockholders: A
Reply to the Kidder Peabody Study. MIDLAND CORP. FIN. J., Summer 1986, at 33, 36. A later
study argues that, if the two-year limitation is dropped, the stock prices of a majority of target
companies defeating tender offers did exceed the tender offer consideration adjusted for the rate of
growth in the S&P 500. DONALD G. MARGOTTA & FELICIA MARSTON, LONG-TERM RESULTS OF
DEFEATED TENDER OFFERS (June 1987) (Northeastern Univ. College of Bus. Admin. Working
Paper: 87-29).
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The Kidder study has been criticized for including in its sample companies
that were ultimately acquired at premium prices and did not remain indepen-
dent for the long term.181 But the better approach is in fact to include target
companies that are subsequently acquired. When a target company employs
defensive tactics to defeat an offer and is later acquired at a price that exceeds
that of the defeated offer, defensive tactics have created value for target com-
pany shareholders. Moreover, removing companies that were ultimately ac-
quired from the Kidder study only changes the study's conclusion from pro-
defense to neutral. Of the thirty-eight target companies in the study that ulti-
mately remained independent, nineteen saw their discounted stock prices ex-
ceed the offer price.
1 82
The Kidder study has also been questioned by the results of cumulative ab-
normal return studies.1 88 These studies examine profitability by comparison to
what companies should have earned given their betas and the overall perform-
ance of the market. They assume the validity of the CAPM model as well as
the semi-strong form of EMH. To the extent that CAPM and the semi-strong
form of EMH are open to question, so are the studies. 8 ' More significantly,
the strong form of EMH, rather than the semi-strong form, is the appropriate
referent, and it is not supported by the empirical evidence. 85
The cumulative abnormal return studies show that target companies that
defeat tender offers and remain independent suffer negative cumulative abnor-
mal returns over a period of years after the bid's defeat.186 However, they also
show that target companies that defeat an initial offer but are subsequently
acquired show positive cumulative abnormal returns.18 7 The studies suggest
that the gains in these cases outweigh the losses in cases where the target
company remains independent. 88 As a consequence, the cumulative abnormal
131. Pound, supra note 130, at 36-37.
132. KIDDER, PEABODY & Co., supra note 130, at 1.
133. See. e.g., Michael Bradley et al., The Rationale Behind Jnterfirm Tender Offers, I1 J.
FIN. ECON. 183, 193 (1983); Richard S. Ruback, Do Target Shareholders Lose in Unsuccessful
Control Contests?, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES 137, 148 (Alan J.
Auerbach ed., 1988).
134. See supra note 90 and accompanying text; supra II.C.2.
135. See supra part II.C.3.
136. See Bradley et al., supra note 133, at 193; Ruback, supra note 133, at 148.
137. See Bradley et al., supra note 133, at 193 (concluding that target companies that defend
successfully, but are subsequently acquired, show cumulative abnormal returns of + 17.35 % up to
two years after the bid); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 264-65. But see Ruback, supra
note 133, at 148 (concluding that target companies that defend successfully, but are subsequently
acquired, show total cumulative abnormal returns of -3.23 %). The difference between the Bradley
and Ruback studies may be explained by the small sample used by Ruback, in which only 9 of 33
target companies initially defeated offers and were later acquired. Bradley studied 112 defeated
bids, 86 of which were for target companies that were ultimately acquired.
138. See Bradley et al., supra note 133, at 193; Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 264-65;
see also Gregg A. Jarrell, The Wealth Effects of Litigation by Targets: Do Interests Diverge in a
Merge?, 28 J.L. & ECON. 151, 174 (1985) (employing cumulative abnormal returns methodology
to examine the use of litigation as a defensive tactic and concluding that "[tiarget management
seems to take a value-maximizing gamble by litigating" and that "the actual gains from auctions
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return studies, even if accepted as the norm for analysis, do not justify a per se
ban on preclusive defensive tactics.139
One reading of the empirical evidence suggests that takeover defense is val-
uable only to the extent it is ultimately unsuccessful. 1 0 Based on this view, we
might have a legal rule'that target company directors could use defensive tac-
tics as an aid to negotiations and auctions, but not for the purpose of remain-
ing independent. As noted above, the possibility of preclusion is necessary to
enhance shareholder value when the target company's board has decided to
sell the company.14'
Moreover, although target companies that ultimately remained independent
may have generated share prices that on average did not justify rejecting the
tender offer consideration, a significant number of the target companies in this
category profited by successful takeover defense.' The issue is not whether a
per se rule against defensive tactics is preferable to a rule of directors' carte
blanche, but whether enough target companies were correct in defeating offers
to justify the cost of case-by-case litigation. Because a substantial percentage
of target companies justifiably opposed offers, case-by-case litigation is indeed
appropriate.
E. Conclusion
The empirical evidence on both EMH and the effects of successful takeover
defense does not, as the EMH proponents claim, justify a per se rule against
preclusive defensive tactics. The market has not been, and should not be, le-
gally determinative of value. In the words of the Delaware Court of Chancery:
"[Jiust as the Constitution does not enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer's social
compensate target shareholders for the losses of thwarted takeovers, on average"). But see
Ruback, supra note 133, at 148.
139. In weighing the benefits and costs of takeover defense, it is worth noting that most target
companies are ultimately acquired. One author, writing when the deferential business judgment
rule governed judicial review of takeover defense, concluded that "only about twenty to twenty-
five percent of target companies remain independent once there has been an initial tender offer."
Coffee, supra note 106, at 1149. There is, therefore, a greater risk in having a per se rule against
takeover defense than in allowing directors latitude. Such a per se rule would threaten the aggre-
gate gains to target shareholders in the 75% of the cases in which the target company is ulti-
mately acquired. Allowing directors latitude would impose potential costs in the 25 % of the cases
in which the target company remains independent.
140. Cf. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 264 (arguing that "successful target defenses
may indeed make shareholders better off-but only if target firms are subsequently acquired in a
later transaction").
141. See supra text accompanying notes 99-104, 106-08.
142. See William J. Carney, Controlling Management Opportunism in the Market for Corpo-
rate Control: An Agency Cost Model, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 385, 392-402 (surveying the wealth
effects of a variety of defensive tactics and concluding that for each tactic a substantial number of
cases have positive outcomes). The Kidder Peabody study concludes that 50% of targets that
remained independent saw their discounted stock prices increase above the offer price. See supra
text accompanying note 132. The Ruback study concludes that 21% of targets that remained
independent had positive total cumulative abnormal returns. See Ruback, supra note 133, at 148.
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statics, neither does the common law of directors' duties elevate the theory of
a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text."148
III. SHAREHOLDER CHOICE
The empirical evidence on EMH and the effects of successful takeover de-
fense demonstrate that an economic choice must be made in the tender offer
context. Rational actors can take the position that a premium tender offer is
inadequate and should be rejected. Courts and commentators have suggested
that any economic choice regarding tender offers must be made by the target
company's shareholders.1"
This solution is unworkable because the tender offer process is inherently
coercive. Although courts and commentators have recognized the coercive im-
pact of tender offers,"4 5 they have underestimated the extent of the problem.
This part argues that the coercion inherent in the tender offer process is virtu-
ally absolute. In most cases, shareholders have no choice but to tender. Courts
and commentators have also suggested that tender offer coercion can be elimi-
nated if the offeror makes an all-cash, all-shares offer and announces that it
intends to effect a second-step merger at the tender offer price.14 6 This part
argues that this form of offer does not solve the problem of tender offer
coercion.
The following hypothetical will be used as an aid to analysis. Assume that
the market price of the target company's stock is $50 per share. A bidder
makes a premium tender offer, conditions its offer on obtaining 51 % of the
target company's stock, and intends to enforce the condition. 4 7 If the- bidder
obtains 51 % of the target company's stock, the offer succeeds and the bidder
purchases tendered shares at the offer price. If 51% of the target company's
shares are not tendered, the offer fails and the bidder returns any tendered
143. Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,514, at 93,277 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989), affd, 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990).
144. See City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Aquisi-
tions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112-15 (Del. Ch. 1986); Lucian A.
Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 98 HARV.
L. REV. 1693, 1700-06 (1985); Gilson, supra note 13, at 845-48; cf. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 81-84 (1987) (upholding a state antitakeover statute that enhanced
the goal of shareholder choice).
145. See, e.g., Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio 1982) (noting that "any
tender offer is likely to be coercive to some degree"); Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1717-33; Mar-
tin Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAw. 101, 113-14 (1979); Lowen-
stein, supra note 122, at 307-09.
146. See infra note 166 and accompanying text.
147. Approximately 90% of all tender offers are conditioned on the bidder's obtaining sufficient
control to effect a squeeze-out merger. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods
Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 499 (7th Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989). This
condition usually requires that the bidder obtain at least 51% of the target company stock. See
supra note 3 (noting that state law typically requires a 51% or 67% shareholder vote to effect a
merger); see also Leebron, supra note 107, at 162 (noting that "the acquisition of a substantial
minority interest without control is rarely the subject of a tender offer").
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shares. No target shareholder owns enough stock to affect the outcome of the
offer.1 48 If the tender offer process gave target shareholders a free choice, a
target shareholder should tender if and only if the value of the offer exceeds
his estimate of the value of the target company as an independent concern. 49
A. Partial Offers
1. The Two-Tiered Offer
The classic example of a coercive tender offer is the two-tiered tender of-
fer.' 50 Assume that a bidder offers to purchase 51 % of a target company for
$100 and announces its desire to effect a second-step merger at $50 per share
if the offer succeeds. 5 Under ideal conditions a target shareholder should
tender if and only if the blended value of the offer ($75 per share) is higher
than his estimate of the target company's independent value. However, a ra-
tional target shareholder who believes that his company is worth more than
$75 per share should nevertheless tender.
Either enough target shareholders will tender to satisfy the 51 % condition
and allow the offer to succeed or they will not. Our hypothetical shareholder's
decision is irrelevant because he does not own enough shares to affect the out-
come of the offer. If the offer succeeds, the target company's value as an inde-
pendent concern is also irrelevant because the target company is not going to
remain independent. The only relevant comparison is between the tender offer
price ($100) and the second-step price ($50). Our hypothetical shareholder
should tender to sell as many of his shares for $100, and as few for $50, as
possible. 5 If the offer fails, nothing our hypothetical shareholder does makes
any difference. All tendering shareholders get their stock back. 53 Therefore,
our hypothetical shareholder should tender without regard to his view on the
148. This condition is realistic. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1720 ("[Tlhe shareholder will
pay little attention to the question of how his decision will affect the probabilities of the two
possible outcomes of the bid-the bidder gaining control over the target and the bidder failing to
do so."). One study found that no single shareholder owned as much as a 10% stake in 169 of the
200 largest nonfinancial public corporations. See Robert J. Larner, Ownership and Control in the
200 Largest Nonfinancial Corporations, 1929 and 1963, 56 AM. EcoN. REV. 777 (1966).
149. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1700-06.
150. A two-tiered tender offer is "a partial tender offer ... coupled with an announced plan to
follow up with a second-step merger at a lower price per share." Theodore N. Mirvis, Two-Tier
Pricing: Some Appraisal and "Entire Fairness" Valuation Issues, 38 Bus. LAW. 485, 485 (1983).
151. The two-tiered offer is legal under federal law. See Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 630 (D. Md. 1982) (noting that the Williams Act proscribes only decep-
tive practices). Under state law, the only impediment is that minority shareholders dissenting from
the merger may seek appraisal. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 703-04 (Del. 1983).
However, appraisal typically does not include any gains flowing from the combination. See, e.g.,
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (1991). Therefore, the control premium included in the first-step
tender offer price need not be included in the second-step merger price.
152. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1721 ("[Il]f the bid is going to succeed, the shareholder
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merits of the tender offer. 154
The courts and commentators have recognized the coercive effect of the
two-tiered tender offer.1 5 They have failed to recognize that the coercion is
virtually absolute. 56
154. Thus, the offer should succeed even if all target shareholders view it as undesirable. This
phenomenon, where individuals acting rationally achieve a result that is irrational from the
group's perspective, is known in the realm of game theory as the prisoner's dilemma. See
Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 106, at 1040; Lowen-
stein, supra note 122, at 307. The problem is that target company shareholders are unable to
communicate with each other for the purpose of taking collective action. In most cases, no single
shareholder owns enough stock to justify shouldering the expense of such coordination. Collective
action is impossible unless the target company's board acts on behalf of the shareholders or imple-
ments defensive tactics that delay the offer long enough to allow a shareholders meeting to evalu-
ate the offer. In these cases the cost of collective action is dispersed among all shares.
155. See Bendix, 549 F. Supp. at 630; Radol v. Thomas, 534 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (S.D. Ohio
1982); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 956 (Del. 1985); ADVISORY COMMIT-
TEE ON TENDER OFFERS, SEC. & EXCH. COMM'N, REPORT OF RECOMMENDATIONS 25-26 (1983);
Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, Fair Shares in Corporate Mergers and Takeovers, 88
HARV. L. REV. 297, 337 (1974); Jesse A. Finkelstein, Antitakeover Protection Against Two-Tier
and Partial Tender Offers: The Validity of Fair Price, Mandatory Bid, and Flip-Over Provisions
Under Delaware Law, I1 SEC. REG. L.J. 291, 291-93 (1984); Edward F. Greene & James J.
Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV.
647, 679-81 (1984); Lowenstein, supra note 122, at 308; Mirvis, supra note 150, at 489 & n.8;
Oesterle, supra note 97, at 56-63; Note, supra note 13, at 1966.
156. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1733 (concluding that "[m]y claim is not that the cur-
rent distortions are irresistible, but rather that they are substantial"). The text's conclusion will
not be true if two of the hypothetical's assumptions are relaxed. First, if a target shareholder owns
enough shares to affect the outcome of the offer, he will tender if, and only if, the expected gain
from tendering outweighs the expected gain from not tendering. Consider the following hypotheti-
cal: The market price of target company shares is $50 per share; the bidder offers $100 per share
for 100% of the target company; a large shareholder believes that the target company is worth
$120 per share as an independent concern; the post-takeover value of minority shares is $50 per
share; there is a 100% chance that the offer will succeed if the large shareholder tenders; and
there is a 50% chance that the offer will succeed if the large shareholder does not tender. As will
be demonstrated, the coercion inherent in this type of offer is the same as that inherent in the two-
tiered offer. See discussion infra part II1.B.I. If the large shareholder tenders, he receives $100
per share in value. If he does not tender and the offer succeeds, he has $50 per share in value.
This result must be discounted for the 50% chance that it will occur, giving an expected value of
$25 per share. If the large shareholder does not tender and the offer fails, the discounted value
from not tendering is $60 per share ($120 x 50%). The total expected value from not tendering is
$85 per share ($25 + $60). Since the expected value from tendering ($100) is larger than the
expected value from not tendering ($85), the large shareholder is coerced into tendering. How-
ever, when the large shareholder's estimate of the target company's independent value exceeds
$150 per share, he will take the gamble of not tendering. Thus, our large shareholder faces signifi-
cant pressure to tender but the pressure is not absolute.
Second, the bidder may elect to purchase tendered shares if it does not obtain control. Bebchuk
is able to conclude that the pressure to tender is not absolute because he does not accept this
assumption. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1721. In this instance, a target shareholder will
tender if and only if the expected gain from tendering exceeds the expected gain from not tender-
ing, given his view of the likelihood of the offer's success. See id. at 1722. Although this case is a
possibility, it is unlikely. Most bidders are unwilling to purchase a substantial block of shares
unless they can be certain of acquiring 100% of the target through a second-step merger. See
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2. The Pure Partial Offer
Rather than offering to purchase 100% of the target company in two une-
qual steps, the bidder may offer $100 per share for 51 % of the target com-
pany and allow remaining minority shareholders to keep their target company
shares.1 57 In this case, the only relevant comparison is between the offer price
and the post-takeover value of minority shares in the target company. This
value may be more or less than the value of target company shares prior to the
tender offer.
The value of target company shares may be increased by the acquisition of
a controlling interest by the bidder. If the bidder can improve target company
management or create synergies, all target company shares should increase in
value.158 However, acquisition of a control block by the bidder creates the dan-
ger that the bidder will engage in self-dealing at the expense of the minority.
The bidder has the power to divert target company assets to its own use or to
force a second-step merger on terms favorable to it and unfavorable to the
minority.159 Although such actions are subject to legal challenge, enforcing
supra note 147 and accompanying text (noting that 90% of all tender offers are conditioned on
the bidder's obtaining sufficient control to effect a squeeze-out merger). At the very least, most
bidders will insist on gaining control of the target company. Of course, it may be possible to
obtain working control without obtaining an absolute majority. See Essex Universal Corp. v.
Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 579 (2d Cir. 1962) (observing that a 28.3% owner is "almost certain to
have share control as a practical matter"); Freedman v. Restaurant Assocs. Indus., C.A. No. 9212
(Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (holding that individuals owning 37% of a corporations's stock had
control); Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1718-19. But see In re Sea-Land Shareholders Litig., C.A.
No. 8453 (Del. Ch. May 22, 1987) (holding that a 39% shareholder did not have control). Mak-
ing the control threshold less than 51% does not change the analysis. Assume that a 30% stake
gives the bidder control and the bidder conditions its offer on obtaining this amount. If the offer
succeeds, every target company shareholder should tender. If the offer fails, a target shareholder's
tender decision is irrelevant.
157. A pure partial offer may be defined as an offer to buy a controlling interest in a corpora-
tion but less than all its shares without any promise to acquire post-takeover minority shares. See
Finkelstein, supra note 155, at 291.
158. There is evidence that after consummation of partial offers the post-takeover value of mi-
nority shares exceeds the pre-takeover market price. See Michael Bradley, Interfirm Tender Of-
fers and the Market for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 345 (1980). Two commentators have
argued that target shareholders may encroach upon the bidder's acquisition gains in value-enhanc-
ing takeovers by refusing to tender and viewed nontendering shareholders as free riders. See San-
ford J. Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem, and the Theory of
the Corporation, II BELL J. EcON. 42, 43 (1980). However, a bidder will normally employ a
squeeze-out merger to eliminate all target shareholders and avoid this scenario. See Leebron,
supra note 107, at 185. The bidder will postpone effecting a squeeze-out merger only where it has
the capacity to profit from self-dealing or believes it can effect a later squeeze-out merger on more
favorable terms than would have been available immediately following the tender offer. See
Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1711-12.
159. See Beebe v. Pacific Realty Trust, 578 F. Supp. 1128, 1137 (D. Or. 1984) (noting that
acquisition of a 51% interest would "subject the remainifig shareholders to a captive status");
Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1710-13; Finkelstein, supra note 155, at 293; Greene & Junewicz,
supra note 155, at 678-79.
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minority rights is costly and the judicial system is less than perfect. 6 ' There-
fore, just as acquirors typically pay a control premium that reflects the benefit
of increased empowerment, 6 ' there should be a diminution in the post-take-
over value of minority shares to reflect the cost of disempowerment.
Although we cannot determine with certainty how the gains and losses from
the acquisition of a control block will balance out in individual cases, power-
less minority shares should be worth less than shares in a control block. As a
result, the post-takeover value of minority shares should be less than the bid
price. Assume that the costs and benefits to minority shareholders resulting
from the acquisition cancel out. 6 ' The hypothetical partial offer is then
equivalent to the two-tiered offer discussed above because, in either case, the
post-takeover value of minority shares is $50.
The coercion analysis is the same as that for the two-tiered offer. If the offer
succeeds, a target shareholder should tender because the offer price ($100) is
higher than the post-takeover value of minority shares ($50). If the offer fails,
the shareholder's tender decision does not matter. Therefore, a rational target
shareholder should tender without regard to his view of the value of the target
company as an independent concern. 63
B. All-Cash, All-Shares Offers
1. No Second-Step Merger Announced
Instead of using the classically coercive two-tiered and partial offers, a bid-
der may offer to purchase 100% of the target company's shares. Assume that
a bidder makes an all-cash, all-shares offer at $75 per share but does not
promise to purchase nontendered shares in a second-step transaction. This of-
fer looks less coercive than the offers discussed above because, if the offer
succeeds, no target company shareholder is forced to accept minority shares
after the tender offer.'
64
However, the all-cash, all-shares offer does not eliminate tender offer coer-
cion. If the offer succeeds, an all-cash, all-shares offer is indistinguishable
from a pure partial offer from the perspective of a nontendering target share-
holder. In either case, a nontendering shareholder will be a powerless minority
shareholder; and in either case, the post-takeover value of minority shares
should be less than the premium offer price. Therefore, as in the case of the
pure partial offer, a rational target shareholder should tender without regard
160. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1711-12.
161. See, e.g., Essex Universal Corp. v. Yates, 305 F.2d 572, 573-74 (2d Cir. 1962); Zetlin v.
Hanson Holdings, Inc., 397 N.E.2d 387, 388 (N.Y. 1979).
162. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 155, at 681 ("In the case of the partial offer, the
market price of the target company's securities predictably tumbles to pre-offer levels after expira-
tion of the offer.").
163. The courts have recognized the coercive nature of the pure partial offer. See, e.g, Gilbert
v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1135 n.7, 1145 (Del. 1990).
164. See Greene & Junewicz, supra note 155, at 731 (suggesting that the all-cash, all-shares
offer does not pose the same concerns as partial and two-tiered offers).
[Vol. 41:689
1992] LEGITIMACY OF TAKEOVER DEFENSE 723
to his view on the desirability of the offer. There is general recognition that the
all-cash, all-shares offer is coercive."'
2. Second-Step Merger at the Tender Offer Price
Some courts and commentators believe that tender offer coercion can be
eliminated if the bidder makes an all-cash, all-shares offer and promises to
purchase remaining minority shares at the tender offer price. 66 According to
this view, target shareholders do not face a penalty for not tendering. If they
do not tender, but enough of their colleagues do and the offer succeeds,
nontendering shareholders seem to receive the same value as tendering share-
holders in the second-step merger. Therefore, every shareholder seems free to
vote on the merits of the offer when he makes his tender decision.
The promise of a second-step merger at the same nominal price as the
tender offer does not eliminate tender offer coercion. Assume that a bidder
offers to purchase 100% of target company shares for $75 per share. If 51%
tender and the offer succeeds, the bidder promises to acquire remaining minor-
ity shares in a second-step merger at $75 per share' Such a second-step prom-
ise does not eliminate tender offer coercion because the second-step price, al-
though nominally at the same value as the tender offer, is worth less in real
terms.
The nominal second-step price must be discounted for the time value of
money. Tendering shareholders receive $75 per share immediately. Nontender-
ing shareholders receive $75 per share in the future. Assume that the second-
step merger takes two months to consummate' 67 and that the annual discount
rate is 15%.68 The real value of the second step is reduced to $73.17.
The nominal second-step price must also be discounted for the risk that a
second-step merger will not occur. Although the bidder may promise to effect
a second-step merger at the tender offer price, there is no guarantee that it
will be able to do so. The bidder's financing, whether from internal or external
165. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1722 (noting that coercion exists "whether the bid is
partial or for all shares"); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 254 n.29.
166. See City Capitol Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 797-98 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert
M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (Macmillan 1), 552 A.2d 1227, 1239-41 (Del. Ch. 1988); AC Ac-
quisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 112 (Del. Ch. 1986); Gilson &
Kraakman, supra note 21, at 254; Lowenstein, supra note 122, at 93; Prentice & Langmore,
supra note 123, at 461-62; Gregg H. Kanter, Comment, Judicial Review of Antitakeover Devices
Employed in the Noncoercive Tender Offer Context: Making Sense of the Unocal Test, 138 U.
PA. L. REV. 225, 228 n.20 (1989).
167. See, e.g., Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., C.A. No. 8358 (Del. Ch. June 24, 1991)
(second-step merger took eight weeks to effect after consummation of a tender offer); Shapiro v.
Pabst Brewing Co., C.A. No. 7339 (Del. Ch. July 30, 1985) (second-step merger took twelve
weeks to effect after consummation of a tender offer); Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1710.
168. As of August 12, 1991, the interest rate on six-month T-bills was 5.4%. Money Rates,
WALL ST. J., Aug. 13, 1991, at C19. The average market risk premium has historically been
about 9%. See BREALY & MYERS, supra note 92, at 141.
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sources, may disappear. 69
There is also no guarantee that the bidder will be willing to proceed with a
second-step merger. The bidder's promise to purchase minority shares in a
second step is typically stated in language that is less than airtight. For exam-
ple, the bidder will often say only that it intends to effect a second-step merger
at the tender offer price.' If it becomes disadvantageous for the bidder to
proceed with the second step, as it would if events in the real world caused
target company shares to decline substantially after the tender offer, the bid-
der may attempt to avoid fulfilling its promise.
Assume that discounts for the time value of money and the risk that a sec-
ond-step merger at the tender offer price will not occur reduce the real value
of the second-step merger in our hypothetical to $72 per share. As a result, the
tender offer has a value of $75 per share, and the second-step merger has a
value of $72 per share. This form of offer is indistinguishable from the two-
tiered offer discussed above and coercive for all the same reasons. If the offer
succeeds, every shareholder would prefer to have $75 rather than $72 in value
and that is the only comparison that matters.' The courts and commentators
may have believed that an all-cash, all-shares offer that promises a second-step
merger at the tender offer price is noncoercive because they assumed that any
reduction in the value of the second step is de minimis. Although this is an
empirical question whose result is hardly clear and would seem to vary in indi-
vidual cases, the magnitude of the difference between the offer price and the
value of the second step is irrelevant. There can be no disputing that $75 is
worth more than $72 and that every rational shareholder would prefer the
former value to the latter. The analysis would be the same if the real value of
the second step were $74.99. As a consequence, even if the discounts to the
nominal second-step price are small, target shareholders are still forced to
tender.
169. For example, the United Airlines Pilots Union was required to abandon its highly publi-
cized $6.75 billion bid for United when its financing fell through. Revised UAL Plan Seen, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 4, 1989, at D2. Salomon Brothers and Goldman Sachs were required on several occa-
sions to delay and restructure the financing for the $1.5 billion leveraged buyout of Southland
Corporation. Bond to Refinance Salomon Bridge Loan in $850 Million Debt Deal, CORP. FIN.
WK., June 13, 1988, at I.
170. In Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp:, 535 A.2d 1134 (Del. 1987), the bidder
made an all-cash, all-shares offer and announced that it "would seek to acquire all remaining
shares in a second-step transaction at [the tender offer price]." Id. at 1339. The second-step trans-
action, like the tender offer itself, was subject to financing. See id. As the Delaware Supreme
Court correctly noted, "[N]o specific second step transaction had been devised and ... there was
no firm commitment to do so." Id.
171. The Delaware Supreme Court has recognized that the promise of a second-step merger at
the same nominal price as the tender offer does not eliminate tender offer coercion. In Ivanhoe,
the bidder made an all-cash, all-shares offer at $105 per share and announced that it would seek
to acquire remaining minority shares at the same price. Id. at 1339. The court noted that the offer
"fit perfectly the mold" of the coercive two-tier partial tender offer. Id. at 1342.
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C. Solutions to the Problem of Tender Offer Coercion
As demonstrated above, tender offers are coercive because (a) the tender
offer price is always greater than the post-takeover value of minority shares,
and (b) the target shareholder's "vote" on the tender offer is connected to the
tender decision. As a consequence, rational shareholders should tender to en-
sure that they obtain the higher tender offer price. However, if the vote on the
tender offer is disconnected from the tendering decision, tender offer coercion
evaporates. If target company shareholders could vote "no" on the tender offer
and still tender if enough of their colleagues voted "yes" to allow the offer to
succeed, each shareholder could freely express himself on the merits of the
offer. At least three strategies are available to serve this end.
First, Professor Bebchuk has suggested that Congress change federal tender
offer procedure. Under Professor Bebchuk's proposal, a bid would be allowed
to proceed if and only if a majority of target company shares voted in favor of
the bid. Shareholders would simultaneously mark their transmittal forms with
their views on whether the bid should succeed or fail and their desires if the
bid succeeds. Presumably, all target shareholders would express a desire to
tender in the event the bidder obtained sufficient shareholder support to
purchase a controlling interest. Under this scheme, all target company share-
holders could vote freely on the merits of the offer.
172
Second, some states have enacted control share acquisition statutes. 173 These
statutes deny a bidder the ability to vote shares that were obtained in a tender
offer and comprise a control block unless a majority of the target company's
disinterested shares agree to grant such voting rights. Although such statutes
do not formally impede the bidder's ability to acquire shares in a tender offer,
their practical effect is to force the bidder to condition its offer on winning the
requisite vote and leave its offer open until the vote has been concluded.1 7'
This scheme eliminates tender offer coercion because a target company share-
holder can vote to deny the bidder voting rights but still tender if enough of
his colleagues disagree and the bid proceeds. 17
Third, the bidder itself can eliminate tender offer coercion. If the bidder
makes an all-cash, all-shares offer, unconditionally promises a second-step
merger at the tender offer price, puts the financing for the second-step merger
in escrow, and pays interest on the second-step financing, there is no coercion.
172. See Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1747-49.
173. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1211 to 10-1217 (Supp. 1990); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 1 IOD, §§ 1-8, ch. II OE, §§ 1-7 (West 1990); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 302A.671 (West
Supp. 1991); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 351.407 (Vernon 1991); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.83.1
(Anderson Supp. 1990); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.25(9) (West Supp. 1990). The constitutionality
of the control share acquisition statute was upheld in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America,
481 U.S. 69 (1987).
174. See CTS, 481 U.S. at 84-85.
175. Although control share acquisition statutes serve the same purpose as Bebchuk's proposal
and are equally effective at eliminating tender offer coercion, they force the bidder to delay its
offer for sufficient time to have a shareholders meeting and entail greater transaction costs. See
id.; Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 222-23.
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Putting the financing in escrow eliminates the risk that the bidder will not be
able to proceed with the second-step merger. Paying interest makes the pre-
sent value of the second step equal to the tender offer price. As a consequence,
the real value of the second step is the same as that of the tender offer. A
target company shareholder who believes that the independent value of his
company exceeds the tender offer price is not pressured into tendering because
there is no economic penalty for not tendering.
Although the elimination of tender offer coercion is conceivable, it is not yet
a reality. Congress, in its wisdom, has not seen fit to adopt Professor
Bebchuk's scheme. Although control share acquisition statutes have been pop-
ular, many states, most notably Delaware, do not have such statutes. Bidders
are not in the habit of making iron-clad guarantees to proceed with second-
step mergers at tender offer prices plus interest.
Thus, the current scheme is one in which target company shareholders have
virtually no choice when making tender decisions. If EMH were established
beyond question, the system would be akin to corporate eminent domain. Any
bidder could seize a target shareholder's property by paying a price in excess
of the prevailing market price,"' Such a system would be objectionable on the
grounds that tender offers are contractual rather than tortious in nature and
that our system relies on property rules rather than liability rules in the con-
tractual sphere."'
Moreover, once it is admitted that EMH can be questioned, tender offer
coercion legitimizes a form of stealing in those cases where target company
shares are undervalued by the market. Thus, although one might wish for a
system in which shareholders could exercise a free choice, that system does not
yet exist. It is wishful thinking to argue that the potential for eliminating the
problem of tender offer coercion justifies leaving the tender decision solely in
the hands of shareholders."' 8
IV. THE ROLE OF THE TARGET COMPANY'S BOARD
As a consequence of tender offer coercion, the target company's board must
have the capacity to oppose inadequate tender offers. The target company's
board should also have this power because directors have a duty to make deci-
sions on acquisition proposals and because directors are best situated to make
such decisions.
176. Opponents of defensive tactics have not denied that tender offer coercion exists. Rather,
they have argued that such coercion is beneficial because premium takeovers are value-creating
and forcing shareholders to tender is socially productive. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook &
Daniel R. Fischel, Corporate Control Transactions, 91 YALE L.J. 698, 710-11 (1982); cf. Gross-
man & Hart, supra note 158, at 43 (viewing nontendering shareholders as free riders who reduce
the bidder's acquisition gains and, therefore, the disciplining effect of the market for corporate
control).
177. See Bebchuk, supra noie 99, at 200; Haddock et al., supra note 97, at 705-08.
178. But see Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 216 n.34, 222-23.
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A. The Duties of Target Company Directors
In all American jurisdictions, it is the job of the board of directors to man-
age, or supervise the managing of, the corporation's business." 9 The board's
affirmative concurrence is usually required by statute for all sale-type transac-
tions. 8 0 The tender offer is indistinguishable from the more traditional statu-
tory methods of transferring assets. Therefore, target directors should have the
power to resist tender offers.181
One commentator has argued that, as a matter of statutory construction,
directors should lack the power to adopt preclusive defensive tactics. Accord-
ing to this view, the legislature specified various acquisition methods requiring
the assent of the target company's board. Since the power to preclude tender
offers was not among them, the legislature's inaction should be interpreted as
denying in the tender offer context the power the board has to prevent other
sale-type transactions.1 82 However, most state corporation statutes were passed
before the tender offer became a popular method of acquisition. 83 Therefore,
179. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 300(a) (West 1990); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a)
(1983); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW § 7.01 (McKinney 1986).
180. See. e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 251(b), 271(a), 275(a) (1990) (governing mergers,
sales of substantially all of a corporation's assets, and liquidations). One commentator has argued
that sale-type decisions also require shareholder concurrence and, therefore, that target company
directors should not have access to defensive mechanisms without shareholder approval. See Gil-
son, supra note 13, at 848 n.106. However, shareholder concurrence is only required if the board
decides to proceed with the transaction. The board may veto a statutory sale-type transaction
without shareholder participation.
181. The Delaware Supreme Court has often noted that the board's power to act in the take-
over defense context is related to its general authority to manage the corporation's business and its
power to disapprove sale-type transactions. See Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571
A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990); Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc. (Macmillan II), 559 A.2d
1261, 1280 (Del. 1989); Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del.
1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 179 (Del. 1986);
Moran v. Household Int'l, Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1353 (Del. 1985); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petro-
leum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 953-54 & n.8 (Del. 1985).
The Delaware Supreme Court has also held that, in exercising their statutory duties to approve
mergers, directors have an affirmative obligation not to facilitate an offer at a price below a com-
pany's intrinsic value. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875-78 (Del. 1984). This duty
extends to the tender offer context, where the directors' power to act rests on the common law. See
Paramount, 571 A.2d at 1150 n.12; Macmillan 11, 559 A.2d at 1280 ("[Delaware law demands
not only that] corporate fiduciaries absolutely refrain from any act which breaches the trust re-
posed in them, but also to affirmatively protect and defend those interests entrusted to them.
Officers and directors must exert all reasonable and lawful efforts to ensure that the corporation is
not deprived of any advantage to which it is entitled."). The standard by which the board's con-
duct is reviewed, however, is different in the merger and tender offer contexts. When the board
acts with respect to a merger, the board's conduct is reviewed under the business judgment rule.
When the board takes defensive action in response to a tender offer, its conduct is reviewed under
Unocal. See TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 94,334, at 92,181-82 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989).
182. Gilson, supra note 13, at 849.
183. E.g., William H. Steinbrink, Management's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 882, 889 & n.29 (1978).
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state legislatures probably intended that like situations be treated similarly.
Their silence should not be interpreted in accordance with the familiar maxim,
expressio unius est exclusio alterius.84
Opponents of preclusive defensive tactics have also argued that, whatever
the views of state legislatures on the dates their corporation statutes were
passed, these statutes have been amended over time. Once the tender offer
became a widespread acquisition technique, state legislatures could have been
expected to add tender offer defense to the list of the board's acquisition-re-
lated powers had they desired the board to play a role in the tender offer
process.185 Nevertheless, most state legislatures have not done so.188
Once again, legislative silence should not be interpreted as intending to pro-
scribe preclusive defensive tactics. When faced with the problem of defensive
tactics, the courts filled in the gaps in the legislative scheme and granted to
target company directors a power similar to that enjoyed in other sale-type
contexts.1 87 State legislatures, therefore, had no need to act in this area. Far
from indicating a desire to restrict defensive tactics, legislative silence in the
face of court decisions approving defensive tactics should be construed as as-
sent to this line of common law authority. 88
As a matter of policy, opponents of defensive tactics have argued that the
utility of the tender offer process lies precisely in the fact that it is the one
method of acquisition that does not require the assent of the target company's
board.' The tender offer process is a creature of federal law, which allows
bidders to make offers directly to shareholders of the target company. How-
ever, federal law is concerned only with the integrity of the tender offer pro-
cess. 180 The ability of target company directors to defend against an offer is
governed by state law.' It seems odd to argue that state courts should allow
184. See SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.23 (Norman J. Singer ed., 5th ed.
1992). Translated, this maxim of statutory construction means "the expression of one thing is the
exclusion of another." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990).
185. See Gilson, supra note 13, at 849.
186. But see OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(D) (Anderson Supp. 1990) (upholding defen-
sive action by a target company board unless a plaintiff can prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the board violated its fiduciary duties).
187. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15 and note 181.
188. See Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1983); Merrill Lynch,
Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 381-82 (1982).
189. See, e.g., Bebchuk, supra note 144, at 1704-05; Gilson, supra note 13, at 850.
190. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1988) (requiring the bidder to purchase shares pro rata
if the number of tendered shares exceeds the number the bidder is willing to purchase); 17 C.F.R.
§ 240.14d-10 (1990) (requiring the bidder to make the offer to all target company shareholders on
the same terms); id. § 240.14d-100 (regulating the provision of information by the bidder to
target company shareholders); id. § 240.14d-101 (regulating the provision of information by the
target company's board to shareholders); id. § 240.14e-I (requiring the bidder to keep the offer
open for at least twenty days).
191. See Schreiber v. Burlington N., Inc., 472 U.S. 1 (1985) (holding that the Williams Act
does not govern fiduciary duty claims); Santa Fe Indus. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977) (holding
that Rule 10b-5 does not govern fiduciary duty claims). Direct state regulation of the tender offer
process violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. Edgar v. Mite Corp.,
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bidders to use the tender offer process to evade the general state law scheme,
which requires board assent to all sale-type transactions. The board should
have the power to oppose undesirable tender offers because the board is the
corporate actor charged with making such decisions.
B. The Target Company's Board as the Best Decision-Maker
The state law policy that gives the board a central role in tender offer trans-
actions is sound. In most cases, the board is in a position to make a better
decision than the target company's shareholders on the merits of the offer. The
board often has better information about the target company than the com-
pany's shareholders. 92
Some have argued that if directors have superior information about a target
company, they should do nothing other than pass that information along to
shareholders with an explanation of why the information suggests that the
tender offer should not be accepted.193 This solution is flawed for a number of
reasons. First, as demonstrated in Part III, shareholders will have little oppor-
tunity to act on the directors' information if they conclude that the informa-
tion requires declining the offer.
Second, some inside information cannot be made public because disclosure
would decrease the value of the information. For example, target company
management may know that certain mineral rights are available for purchase
at bargain prices. To disclose this information would be self-defeating.1 9' In
457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982) (plurality). Therefore, the states could not give the target company
board the same statutory veto power that they have in other sale-type contexts. However, the
states may permit defensive tactics that have the effect of precluding offers because the states
have the power to govern internal corporate affairs without regard to the indirect impact on tender
offers. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 88-89 (1987).
192. See supra part II.C.3. The relevant issue in the tender offer context is the future value of
the target company. This value depends less on historical information than it does on assessment
of soft information regarding future plans and values. See Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 209. The
board usually has information about the specific way in which it plans to run the business in the
future and projections of future performance that shareholders do not have. It is well recognized
that it is more advantageous to a bidder to pursue a friendly acquisition than a hostile one because
in the former case the bidder can receive nonpublic information about the target company. See,
e.g., Bebchuk, The Case for Facilitating Competing Tender Offers, supra note 106, at 1054-55;
Gilson, supra note 13, at 850 & n.112. If the target company board can be expected to have
information that the bidder, which has presumably done an extensive analysis of the target com-
pany, does not have, it should also be expected to have information that its own shareholders and
the market do not have.
193. E.g., Gilson, supra note 13, at 859; Schwartz, supra note 106, at 241.
194. See SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848-49 (2d Cir. 1968) (en banc), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 660 (Mass. 1933); see also Dale
A. Oesterle, The Negotiation Model of Tender Offer Defenses and the Delaware Supreme Court,
72 CORNELL L. REV. 117, 125-26 (1986) ("[D]ivulging inside information often damages the
interests of both the target and its shareholders."); Christopher Rebel J. Pace, Determining Price
Inadequacy with Neutral Decision Making and Expert Assistance: A Principled Way To "'Just
Say No," 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 57, 70-71 (1991) ("[W]hile the market value of a stock may be the
best publicly-available indicator of a firm's value, it is not a perfect indicator of value because it
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addition, forcing the board to disclose all information relevant to value would
make it impossible for the target company's board to negotiate with the bid-
der. Since the bidder does not have to disclose its information relating to the
value of the acquisition, the target company's board would be at an unfair
disadvantage.
Third, the tender offer process does not give the shareholders enough time to
perform the same analyses as the board. Presumably the board is concerned on
an ongoing basis with the value of the company's shares and whether the mar-
ket accurately reflects that value. If the board's view is based on material,
nonpublic information that the board disseminates in the middle of a tender
offer contest, the shareholders will have limited time to analyze such informa-
tion. If defensive tactics were prohibited, bidders would be able to close their
offers within twenty days,'95 which may not be enough time for shareholders
to digest and analyze new information promulgated by the board.196
Fourth, the shareholders' ability to analyze information is complicated by
the fact that the tender offer process is not static. In response to the bidder's
offer, the target company board usually considers a wide range of alternatives,
including pursuing the company's current business plan,1 97 restructuring the
company,198 or seeking out a white knight. 99 Only the board has complete
information regarding all these alternatives at any given time. From the share-
holders' perspective, it is difficult even to discern which strategy to compare to
the bidder's proposal.
Fifth, individual shareholders lack the financial incentive to perform the
same investigation as the board regarding the company's value. It will usually
be the case that no single shareholder owns enough stock to warrant his incur-
ring the cost of analyzing all the information necessary to arrive at an accu-
rate estimate of target company value. 20 0 Investigation by individual share-
holders would also result in duplication of effort. Allowing the board to
examine value disperses the investigation costs among the entire body of
shareholders and makes investigation economical. In this sense, shareholders
benefit from economies of scale.
cannot account for information not yet known to the market.").
195. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-I (1990).
196. See Bebchuk, supra note 125, at 259 ("[T]he verification, digestion, and evaluation of
information takes time."); Lipton, supra note 56, at 70 (suggesting that 90 to 120 days are re-
quired to allow shareholders sufficient time to consider all the information relevant to a proxy fight
in the tender offer context); Lowenstein, supra note 122, at 317 (recommending that the Williams
Act be amended to give shareholders six months to consider takeover related issues).
197. E.g., Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1990).
198. E.g., British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F.
Supp. 1519, 1528 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Gelco Corp. v. Coniston Partners, 652 F. Supp. 829, 835 (D.
Minn. 1986), atfd in part & vacated in part, 811 F.2d 414 (8th Cir. 1986); City Capital Assocs.
v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 790 (Del. Ch. 1988).
199. E.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan Co. (Macmillan 11), 559 A.2d 1261, 1272 (Del.
1989); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 178 (Del. 1986); In
re Holly Farms Corp. Shareholders Litig., 564 A.2d 342, 343-44 (Del. Ch. 1989).
200. See Oesterle, supra note 194, at 129 n.50.
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Even if shareholders have the same information as the target company's
board, and the same incentive and opportunity to analyze it, the board is still
in a better position to make tender offer decisions. As previously noted, the
evidence that trading insiders outperform the market is at least partly explica-
ble on the basis of their superior expertise.20 1 Specialization of the managerial
function is one of the benefits of the large public corporation. 202 Most manag-
ers should be better estimators of a company's value than shareholders. 03
V. CHECKING THE BOARD'S DISCRETION
If directors were perfectly loyal agents, it would be unnecessary to place
checks on their discretion. We could trust target company directors to employ
takeover defense solely for the benefit of shareholders. Any checks on director
discretion would be counterproductive because the directors are in the best
position to determine whether takeover defense is justified in particular cases.
However, in the real world there is always a danger that the directors will act
to further their own interests rather than those of shareholders.2 0 ' This danger
is magnified in the takeover defense context because perpetuation of the direc-
tors' perquisites and power is at issue.2 5 There are two mechanisms that serve
to keep director agency costs within limits: shareholder action and judicial
review.
A. Shareholder Action
According to the paradigm of corporate democracy, shareholders elect di-
rectors to run the corporation. Shareholders who object to board action have
no power to prevent the directors from pursuing their chosen course .20  The
shareholders' recourse is to remove the directors.20 7
This ideal solution poses some practical difficulties. Because shareholdings
201. See supra note 128 and accompanying text..
202. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 176, at 700.
203. See Carney, supra note 142, at 415 ("It is highly unlikely that investors as a group would
make decisions superior to those of loyal management."). But see Pace, supra note 194, at 67 n.52
("Many sophisticated investors are probably as capable as management, given equal access to
relevant information, in understanding and dissecting company valuations.").
204. The danger that an agent will act in his own interest rather than that of his principal is
the familiar problem of agency costs. See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, The-
ory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON.
305, 308 (1976).
205. See generally Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1168-74 (discussing agency costs in
the takeover context).
206. See, e.g., People ex rel. Manice v. Powell, 94 N.E. 634, 637 (N.Y. 1911) ("[T]he stock-
holder cannot act in relation to the ordinary business of the corporation, nor can they control the
directors in the exercise of the judgement vested in them by virtue of their office.").
207. See, e.g., Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 959 (Del. 1985) (noting in
the takeover defense context that "[i]f the stockholders are displeased with the action of their
elected representatives, the powers of corporate democracy are at their disposal to turn the board
out").
19921
732 DEPAUL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:689
are dispersed, an individual shareholder will seldom assume the cost of moni-
toring the board's conduct and taking corrective action via a proxy fight .20
Moreover, in the takeover defense context, a proxy fight may not be a viable
option. If the target company board resists a bid and the annual meeting date
is distant, shareholders may not have the power to call a special meeting for
the purpose of electing new directors or nullifying defensive mechanisms.20 9
Even if target company shareholders possess the power to call a special meet-
ing, there is no guarantee that the bidder will be willing to extend its bid so
that the proxy process can be completed.
The bidder, unlike target company shareholders, does have enough at stake
to consider waging a proxy fight against the target company's board. However,
the proxy fight mechanism also has a number of disadvantages from the bid-
der's perspective. It is potentially lengthier and more expensive than the tender
offer process. 10 The bidder must pay its own expenses up front, and it gets
reimbursed from the target company's treasury only if it wins the proxy fight.
The target company's board can pay the entire expense of the contest out of
the corporate treasury, win or lose.21' The proxy mechanism is also biased in
favor of the incumbents.212 Collectively, employees often own a substantial
amount of stock 12 and tend to favor incumbent management.2 14 In addition,
208. See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 6, at 1170-71; Gilson, supra note 13, at 843;
Grossman & Hart, supra note 158, at 42.
209. The method of setting annual meeting dates is usually specified in a corporation's bylaws.
See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 211(b) (1991). The board always has the power to call a
special meeting of stockholders. Shareholders have such power only to the extent it is specified in
the corporate charter or bylaws. See, e.g., id. A typical bylaw provision gives shareholders owning
a specified percentage of the company's stock the power to call a special meeting. See, e.g., Auer
v. Dressel, 118 N.E.2d 590, 592 (N.Y. 1954) (noting that a company's bylaws permitted stock-
holders owning a majority of the company's capital stock to call a special meeting).
210. Federal law allows tender offers to be consummated twenty days after commencement. 17
C.F.R. § 240.14e-l (1991). By contrast, AT&T's recent proxy fight against the board of NCR
took three months from the time the fight was announced to completion. See Eben Shapiro,
A.T.&T. Buying Computer Maker in Stock Deal Worth $7.4 billion, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1991,
at Al. The AT&T/NCR contest illustrates another limitation of the proxy-fight mechanism. Al-
though AT&T captured a majority of votes at NCR's annual meeting, it was able to replace only
one-third of NCR's directors because NCR had a staggered board. To replace a majority of direc-
tors, AT&T would have been required to wait another year. See Larry Black, AT&T Raises Offer
for NCR, THE INDEPENDENT, Apr. 23, 1991, at 18.
211. Hall v. Trans-Lux Daylight Picture Screen Corp., 170 A. 226, 227 (Del. Ch. 1934); Ro-
senfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 128 N.E.2d 291, 292-93 (N.Y. 1955).
212. See Ronald J. Gilson, Just Say No to Whom?, 25 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 123 (1990)
(questioning the utility of the proxy process in light of "management domination of the proxy
machinery and the collective action problems associated with shareholder voting").
213. See John Hoerr, "We're Not Going To Sit Around and Allow Management To Louse
Things Up," Bus. WK., May 18, 1987, at 107 ("[E]mployees own at least 20% of nearly 30
publicly traded companies with more than 1,000 workers.").
214. See Shamrock Holdings, Inc. v. Polaroid Corp., 559 A.2d 257, 274 (Del. Ch. 1989) (up-
holding creation of Employee Stock Ownership Plan ("ESOP") that issued 14% of target com-
pany outstanding stock to its employees, despite recognition that employee voters tend to favor
management "based upon its easy access to the employees and their likely concern about job
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some percentage of shareholders will usually cast all their votes with
management.21 5
Despite these limitations, bidders may find it worthwhile to use the corpo-
rate election machinery to wage battles against defensive tactics. Although
proxy fights were once thought to cost more and take longer than tender of-
fers, these differences have narrowed as takeover litigation has become drawn
out and expensive.2 16 The bias inherent in the proxy process has been reduced
over time as institutional investors have come to dominate the market.21 7 Al-
though traditionally supporters of management, institutional investors have be-
come more confrontational.
218
There are sound reasons for bidders to prefer the proxy process to the tender
offer process. The proxy process provides fewer opportunities for interference
by target company directors. Whereas takeover defense is reviewed under the
Unocal standard, attempts to manipulate the corporate machinery for the pur-
pose of obstructing a bidder's proxy fight are reviewed less deferentially. To
postpone a shareholders meeting, or take other action designed to impede the
bidder, the target company's board must demonstrate a compelling justifica-
tion.219 Moreover, if the bidder wins the proxy fight, it also wins the takeover
security"). The courts' reaction to ESOPs as a defensive mechanism has been mixed. Compare
British Printing & Communication Corp. v. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 1519,
1528-29, 1531 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (upholding ESOP) and Danaher Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic
Tool Co., 635 F. Supp. 246, 1066 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (accepting ESOP without discussion) and
Weinberg v. Cameron, [1979-80 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 97,377 (D. Haw.
Mar. 21, 1980) (upholding ESOP) with Norlin v. Rooney Pace Inc., 744 F.2d 255, 266-67 (2d
Cir. 1984) (rejecting ESOP) and Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975)
(same) and Podesta v. Calumet Indus., [1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,433
(N.D. Ill. May 9, 1978) (same).
215. See Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote No or Just Don't Vote, 729 PRACTICING L. INST. 829,
845 (1991) (noting the "knee-jerk support for incumbent boards").
216. See, e.g., Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 498 (7th
Cir.) (Easterbrook, J.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 955 (1989) (over five months between initial bid
and resolution of litigation); Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del.
1990) (over eight months between initial bid and resolution of litigation); Mills Acquisition Co. v.
Macmillan Co. (Macmillan I1), 559 A.2d 1261, 1272 (Del. 1989) (over three months between
initial bid and resolution of litigation where the Delaware Supreme Court rendered an oral deci-
sion in advance of its written opinion); TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 94,334, at 92,176 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (over four months
between initial bid and resolution of litigation where case was not appealed); Polaroid, 559 A.2d
at 281 (over five months between initial bid and resolution of litigation where case was not
appealed).
217. As of 1989, institutional investors owned over 45% of total equities in the United States.
Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional Shareholder Activism,
79 GEO. L.J. 445, 447 (1991).
218. See Lipton, supra note 56, at 8-9; Rock, supra note 217, at 449-51; Steinberg, supra note
84, at 30-31. There are also indications that employee owners are becoming more aggressive. See
Alan Hyde & Craig H. Livingston, Employee Takeovers, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1131 (1989).
219. Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 661 (Del. Ch. 1988). But cf Stahl v. Apple
Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d 1115, 1122, 1124-25 (Del. Ch. 1990) (phrasing the test in the context of
a proxy fight over a tender offer as whether target company directors "have exercised corporate
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battle. It has the power to nullify any remaining takeover defense and need
not fear future defensive action against its bid. Bidders are beginning to turn
back to the proxy fight, and away from exclusive reliance on the hostile tender
offer, as a way of removing incumbent management. 2 0
The proxy process is also a more socially desirable way to resolve takeover
battles than the tender offer process in certain respects. Proxy fights are con-
ducted over a period of time sufficient to allow the shareholders to receive and
digest information relevant to the tender offer.221 Unlike the tender offer pro-
cess, the proxy process does not contain any coercion. Every target shareholder
can vote as he likes on the issue of whether the incumbents or the bidder
should control the target company's board, and therefore on whether the
tender offer should succeed or fail. If a target company shareholder votes for
the incumbents and the bidder wins the election, no penalty is imposed on the
dissenting shareholder. He may still tender into the bidder's offer with all the
shareholders who voted for the bidder and receive the same consideration as
power inequitably" and noting that in such cases "the 'enhanced' business judgment form of re-
view of Unocal and the non-business judgment review of [cases including Blasius] come ...to
resemble each other").
220. See John J. Gavin, Changes in Corporate Control and Governance Communicated
Through Proxy Power, 704 PRACTICING L. INST. 91 (1990); Carl L. Reisner, The Use of the
Proxy Machinery as a Catalyst for Fundamental Corporate Change, 696 PRACTICING L. INST.
649 (1990); Steinberg, supra note 84, at 31 ( noting "the resurgence of the proxy contest as a
viable mechanism to oust incumbent management"). Even if the bidder does not win the proxy
fight, if it obtains a substantial percentage of the vote, the demonstration of shareholder discontent
may be sufficient to force the target company board to accede to the bidder's wishes. In 1988, The
Bank of New York ("BNY") mounted a proxy fight against the board of Irving Bank Corporation
for the purpose of facilitating its tender offer. Although BNY lost, it obtained 48.6% of the vote.
Sarah Bartlett, The Clumsy Quest for Irving Bank, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 1988, § 3, at 1. Within
four months of the conclusion of the proxy fight, Irving's board rescinded its defensive tactics and
allowed BNY's offer to proceed. Anatomy of a Takeover, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 1988, at D5; The
Long Bitter Fight for Irving, AM. BANKER, Oct. 6, 1988, at 15. Similarly, AT&T recently re-
sorted to a proxy fight against the board of NCR to facilitate its tender offer rather than to
litigation challenging the validity of NCR's defensive tactics. Although AT&T obtained 66% of
the shareholder vote, it was unable to obtain immediate control of NCR because NCR had a
staggered board and AT&T did not obtain the 80% needed to remove directors without cause.
See Jeremy Warner, Pressure Grows on NCR To Discuss Bid, THE INDEPENDENT, Mar. 25, 1991,
at 21. Nevertheless, the NCR board agreed to a sweetened deal with AT&T within five weeks of
the proxy contest. Leslie Wayne, Behind the Drop in Proxy Fights, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 1991, at
D10; see also Grundfest, supra note 215 (arguing that shareholders can increase management
discipline by refusing to vote in uncontested elections and conveying its lack of confidence in
management).
221. See Stahl v. Apple Bancorp, Inc., 579 A.2d at 1124 (allowing directors to postpone a
proxy fight over a tender offer to give shareholders enough time to receive and digest information).
Of course, one might still object that, even if shareholders have and understand all relevant infor-
mation, they are still in a worse position than the target company board to assess the merits of a
tender offer. See supra part IV.B. However, the legitimacy of all the board's actions, including its
defensive tactics, rests on election by the shareholders. Although the board may be better situated
to decide takeover questions, the proxy process must be the one sphere in which shareholders have
an absolute say. See Blasius Indus. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d at 666.
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they receive."'
B. Judicial Review
Despite the promise of the proxy process as a method for challenging in-
cumbent management, its inherent limitations require supplementation with
an effective system of judicial review of defensive tactics as a check on man-
agement 2 3 Contrary to the Delaware Supreme Court's apparent view in Par-
amount, the critical issue in the takeover defense context is the one identified
by the chancery court in that case: Does the bid price fairly reflect the intrin-
sic value of the target company? 24 The target company's board should not be
allowed to obstruct a takeover by taking the Olympian position that it prefers
to continue with its current business plan. The burden of proof on the compar-
ative value question should rest with the target company's board because the
board is best informed regarding the target company intrinsic value and has
the best access to proof of such value.225
Although the court should be willing to listen to the board's proof on value,
it should subject the board's proof to a searching inquiry.226 The board should
not be allowed to rest on an unsubstantiated opinion of an investment banker
that the bid price is inadequate. 227 As an initial matter, the board should be
required to explain what strategy it intends to pursue if the bid is defeated.2 28
Identifying this strategy allows comparison of the relevant values. 229 If the
222. The lack of coercion in the proxy process was noted in Bebchuk, supra note 99, at 222-23.
223. Of course, case-by-case review is only justified if "the game [is] worth the candle." Gilson
& Kraakman, supra note 21, at 265. A per se rule against defensive tactics would also limit
management discretion and at considerably less cost. However, as demonstrated above, case-by-
case review seems superior to any per se rule. See supra part lI.D.
224. See discussion supra part 1.C.3; Kalajian, supra note 52. The target company board is
also entitled to require that the bidder fairly share any gains flowing from the combination with
target company shareholders. See supra part II.B.I.
225. Where the facts lie peculiarly within the knowledge of one party, that party is typically
allocated the burden of proof. See, e.g., CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE §
337, at 950 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
226. See Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 271 (noting that the court should examine
"the specificity and completeness of management's plan, the deliberations of the target's board,
expert testimony from both sides, and, most important, the firm's performance history").
227. See id. at 268.
228. See id. at 268-69.
229. The situation becomes complicated if the board's strategy is to negotiate with the bidder.
Forcing the board to disclose at what price it would accept the bidder's offer would make it
impossible to negotiate. If such a rule were the law, the bidder, secure in the knowledge it could
ascertain the board's best price through litigation, would have no incentive to negotiate. This
process would be unfair because the bidder would not have to disclose or justify its offering price
and, although the target company board would have to sell at a price determined to be fair by the
courts, the bidder would not have to buy. A potential solution is to allow directors to make an in
camera submission of proof, which would include a declaration that the board's goal is to negoti-
ate, the price at which the board would accept the bidder's offer, and the board's justification for
the acceptance price. Such a procedure would allow the court to review the board's conduct with-
out tipping the contest unfairly in favor of the bidder.
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board defends against an offer because it wishes to pursue its current business
plan, to have its defensive actions upheld the board should be required to
prove that it reasonably believes that its business plan will generate profits
that, when discounted to present value using an appropriate discount rate,
have a greater value than the bid price. If the board wishes to pursue a re-
structuring alternative to the bid, it should be required to prove that it reason-
ably believes that the present value of the restructuring exceeds that of the
bid.2
80
When employing Unocal in heightened form, a court must be careful not to
usurp the board's function. The court should make a judicial inquiry regarding
the sufficiency of evidence, not a business inquiry. The court should ask
whether the directors have satisfied their burden under Unocal of proving that
they acted reasonably, not whether the court, had it been in the position of the
target company's board, would have acted differently. A range of board re-
sponses to any takeover bid will usually be reasonable. As long as target com-
pany directors choose a reasonable response, their conduct should be upheld. 31
Such judicial self-restraint does not represent a reversion to the business
judgment rule. Indeed, the heightened form of Unocal review suggested above
was seemingly employed sub silentio by the Delaware Court of Chancery prior
to the supreme court's decision in Paramount. For example, in Pillsbury the
chancery court rested on broad principles of shareholder choice to invalidate
defensive tactics. 2 The court may have taken this approach because it be-
lieved it was not able to inquire into the substance of the target company's
230. The courts have recently treated restructuring values as directly comparable to tender
offer values. See Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (Macmillan 1), 552 A.2d 1227, 1241-44
(Del. Ch. 1988); see also TW Servs., Inc. v. SWT Acquisition Corp., [1989 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,334, at 92,181 (Del. Ch. Mar. 2, 1989) (suggesting that restructurings
and sales are equivalent). This view is open to criticism on the ground that a sale of the company
liquidates 100% of the target company shareholder's interest but a restructuring does not. In the
case of a restructuring, the stub share can itself be the later object of a premium tender offer.
However, this criticism should not lead to the conclusion that the values cannot be compared, only
that they cannot be compared directly. Any premium applicable to the stub share attaches only to
that portion of the shareholder's original equity that is left after payment of the restructuring
dividend. For example, in Interco the board proposed a restructuring dividend it valued at $66 per
share, which left a stub share valued at $10 per share. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551
A.2d 787, 793 (Del. Ch. 1988). Accepting the board's values, the restructuring dividend drained
87 % of the value from the company. This 87 % can never again be the subject of a premium offer.
If 50% were an appropriate takeover premium, the target company board would be justified in
turning down offers below $81 per share but not those above $81 per share (i.e., $66 + 1.5($10)
- $81).
231. See Gilbert v. El Paso Co., 575 A.2d 1131, 1145 n.29 (Del. 1990) (noting that Unocal
"implicitly acknowledges that courts should not impose their own business judgment upon inde-
pendent directors who reasonably respond to a threat to the corporate enterprise in good faith and
on an informed basis"). But see Kalajian, supra note 52 (suggesting that the court should decide
on the merits whether a tender offer is adequately priced); Pace, supra note 194, at 88-90 (sug-
gesting that the court, assisted by valuation experts, should determine whether the offer price falls
within a range of adequate prices).
232. See supra text accompanying notes 49-52.
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defensive actions under the supreme court's precedents. However, a substan-
tive Unocal analysis suggests that the chancery court was correct to rule
against the target company's board.2"3
The pre-tender offer price of Pillsbury's stock was $39 per share.2 3 The
bidder's final $63 offer represented about a 60% premium. The Pillsbury
board summarily dismissed the offer as inadequate."3 ' Because the board real-
ized that it could not simply obstruct the bidder's offer, the board proposed a
restructuring it valued at $68 per share. This value was based in part on ex-
ceedingly optimistic forecasts that assumed, without any discernible justifica-
tion, that Pillsbury's corporate performance would improve substantially.3 6 A
better rationale for the result in Pillsbury would have been that the board
failed to meet its Unocal burden of proving that it either reasonably believed
the $63 bid price to be inadequate or that it reasonably believed the restruc-
turing was worth $68 per share. A similar analysis can be applied to the other
Delaware chancery court cases striking down defensive tactics on shareholder
choice grounds.237
Whether the target company's board deserved to prevail under a heightened
form of Unocal review in Unocal, Ivanhoe, and Paramount is harder to discern
because the Delaware Supreme Court decided these cases in favor of the
board without making any extensive examination of whether it was reasonable
to believe that the bid price was less valuable than the alternative chosen by
the board.238 However, just as the chancery court couched decisions that could
have been based on lack of proof regarding value in the language of share-
holder choice, the Delaware Supreme Court may have reached decisions in
these cases for unspoken economic reasons and couched its language in terms
of a lenient Unocal analysis. If this is the case, the Unocal standard may be
more stringent than the supreme court cases suggest.
233. For a similar view of Pillsbury, see Kalajian, supra note 52.
234. There was evidence that the price of Pillsbury's stock was also depressed by an unjustified
accumulation of assets. The Pillsbury board recognized that, by the mid-1980s, the individual
values of its diversified businesses exceeded the market price of its stock. Grand Metro. Pub. Co.
v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049, 1051 (Del. Ch. 1988).
235. Id. at 1052.
236. Id. at 1057.
237. See Kalajian, supra note 52. In Anderson, Clayton, the target company's board responded
to a $56 tender offer with a $60 self-tender for 65% of the company that precluded the bidder's
offer. The target company's investment banker never opined that the bidder's offer was inade-
quate. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 110 (Del. Ch. 1986). In
Macmillan I, the target company's board responded to a $64 bid with a restructuring it valued at
$64.15. The board continued to maintain its opposition to the bid after it was raised to $73.
Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans (Macmillan 1), 552 A.2d 1227, 1236-37 (Del. Ch. 1988). In
Interco, the target company's board rejected as inadequate a $74 tender offer that represented
about a 70% premium over the pre-tender offer market price and fit comfortably within the initial
$68 - $80 valuation range provided by the board's investment banker. The board also proposed a
restructuring it valued at $76; however, the market price of Interco's stock did not exceed $70
after the announcement of the restructuring. City Capital Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787,
791-93 (Del. Ch. 1988).
238. See supra parts I.A, I.C.3, and note 66.
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CONCLUSION
Preclusive defensive tactics have the potential to generate large gains for
target company shareholders. Such tactics may increase the premiums paid
after negotiations and auctions and serve as a shield against inadequate bids.
Although such tactics place the primary decision-making power with respect
to tender offers in the hands of the target company board, the board ought to
have this power. Target shareholders have little or no choice but to accept
premium tender offers. The target company's board is in the business of, and
is better at, making decisions regarding whether and at what price to sell the
company. Therefore, a per se ban on preclusive defensive tactics is not
justified.
Preclusive defensive tactics also threaten to impose large agency costs on
target shareholders. As a consequence, judicial review of takeover defense
must be rigorous. Although Paramount suggests that judicial review of defen-
sive tactics will be deferential, its holding is more limited than much of the
expansive language in the opinion.2" 9 The Delaware Supreme Court cases have
alternated between decisions favorable to bidders and decisions favorable to
target companies. 40 This trend probably involves nothing more than the
march of the common law as later cases test the limits of earlier ones. The
next major takeover defense case may well demonstrate that the Unocal stan-
dard is stronger than Paramount suggests. There is, therefore, reason to be-
lieve that Delaware will come to have a balanced position and allow access to
preclusive defensive tactics subject to effective judicial review.
239. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
240. Target directors prevailed in Unocal and Moran. They were then dealt a setback in Rev-
Ion. Target directors were victorious in Ivanhoe but were defeated again in Macmillan I. Para-
mount represents the latest victory for the target directors. See supra notes 27-39 and accompany-
ing text; supra part I.C.
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